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I • INTRODUCTION 
Ghana and Kenya constitute two of the most prominent 
cases of the agricultural development in colonial Africa. In 
the one case, producer interests became paramount in the colonial 
period; in the other, the interests of producers were sacrificed 
to those of other sectors. This paper examines the divergent 
patterns of growth of commercial agriculture in Ghana and Kenya 
and tries to account for the contrasting outcomes of the process 
of agrarian development. 
In analyzing these cases, the paper addresses two 
distinct audiences. The one is the fraternity of those interested 
in agriculture per se. To them the paper seeks to conununicate 
an appreciation of the fundamental importance of politics to 
the process of agrarian development. Agricultural development 
gives rise to many points of controversy. Urban workers and 
industrial managers support low food prices, while rural producers 
favor high ones. Farmers and other consumers favor low import 
duties for industrial commodities, while those who derive 
their incomes from import substitut ing firms favor dut ies 
which allow them to maintain high prices for their products in 
the dome s t ic market. Infant indust ries favor policy measures 
which enable them to lay hold of the foreign exchange earned 
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by f armers who produce crops for export in the world market . The 
poli c ies which result in each nat ion from these and other encounters 
b e t ween divergent interes t s  in effect constitute that nat ion ' s  
agricultural policy ; and the nature o f  that policy helps to determine 
who benef its from the commerc ializat ion of agricultur e .  The interplay 
o f  organized interests is thus central to the s tudy o f  agricultural
development and this paper attemp ts to show, through the use of 
historical materials, how organized interests influenced the pattern 
of agricultural developmen t in Ghana and Kenya . 
Political scient ists form the second relevant aud ience.  
Under the impact of the resurgence of interest in the subj ect of 
political economy, polit ical scient ists have come to appreciate the 
importance of assumpt ions concerning individual behavior ; they have 
come to accept that human beings may seek to maximiz e  and that they 
use economic and political inst itut ions in their search for greater 
sat isfac t ion; and they have become increasingly interested in 
examining the implications of this perspective . In keeping with the 
tradit ions of their discipline, however, most polit ical scient ists 
cont inue to place primary stress no t upon individuals but upon 
aggregat es; at least since the t ime of Aristotle, students o f  politics 
have examined the properties of collect ive en t i t ies , be they cit ies or 
nat ion s .  A maj or challenge,  then , i s  to use the postulate 
of individual maximiz ation to help to account for the properties 
of more inclusive aggregates . This paper accepts that challenge 
and seeks to explain why the common search for higher income s  
through the development of commercialized agriculture led 
to strikingly different collective outcomes -- outcomes 
characterized by strongly contrasting distributions of the 
gains to be made from the development of a commercialized 
agrarian economy . It explores this topic by analyzing the 
relat ive ability of interests to form organizat ions in defense 
of their economic interests; and it illust rates the fundamental 
importance of the role of state institut ions in facilitat ing 
the formation of organized groups -- a role that turns 
out to be both strikingly obvious and remar kably sub tle .  
Caveats and Justificat ions 
This paper is b ased upon historical, not contemporary , 
materials . And it deals with but two cases . This choice of 
materials imposes obvious limitat ions on the analysis and this 
requires comment and j ust ification. 
It  may appear odd to use historical materials to analyze 
a problem that of the determinant s of agriculture policy 
-- of urgent contemporary interests . But quite apart from 
the obvious rejoinder that present prob lems have historical 
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sources, there is ample j usti fication for using apparently dated 
materials . For many subjects of current interest ,  the data 
from earlier period s are simply more voluminous and more accessible 
than are those f ro m  the contemporary era . This is particularly 
the case in the area of policy formation, where the passage of 
t ime has lowered d efenses and allowed mat erials which are usually 
c losely guarded to enter the pub lic d omain . In analyzing 
the dynamics surrounding the development o f  pub lic policy 
t oward agricul ture, this paper therefore turns to data 
which derives from the pas t ,  and in particu lar from the colonial 
period . 
The paper examines two cases: those o f  the cocoa 
producers in Ghana and the large-scale cereal producers in 
Kenya . 1 Again, the relative abundance of available materials 
played an important part in this select ion . Nonetheless, the 
select ion is open to question, and has in fact b een challenged 
on t wo principal grounds .  One challenge cont end s that the 
small-scale peasant communit ies of Wes t  Africa and the large-
scale settler commun ities of East Africa are qual itatively 
different and attemp t s  to analyze them together simply provoke 
incredul ity . I cannot agree with this content ion , for the 
reasoning und erlying it undercuts the legit imacy of any form 
of comparative analysis . The reasoning only becomes useful 
when the chal lenger can ind icat e where d i fferences in degree 
become fund amental d i f ferences of kind , and I have yet to see 
in the literature on African politics persuasive evidence o f  
any such point s o f  transit ion . A second form of criticism 
is more serious . It contends that the selection of cases is 
poor because too many things vary at once: racial factors , 
political factors, the kinds of marke ts and products,  and so 
on . My reply is t wo fold . Case stud ies are inherently l imited 
to t he development, and not to the testing, of hypotheses .  
fhis study respects tha t limitation and attempts to isolate 
a series o f  fac tors which help to d etermine the form which 
agrarian sectors assume in the process of development . 
i\nd only a larger and more carefully selected sample of 
cases can t e s t  for the significance of these factors . This 
study t hus seeks t o  contribute to the formation and not to 
the proving of argument s ;  and the fact that the number of 
variab les exceeds the number o f  observations is therefore 
less of a problem than would f irst appear . Secondly, from 
time to t ime, I will in fact e mploy some strategic additional 
cases which isolate the operation of one factor while holding 
others constant ; the European growers of export crops in Kenya 
are occass ionally employed in this capac ity . In this way, I 
do t ry to escape the prob lems created by my selection of 
mater ials .  
The selec t ion of mat erials thus does impose 
limitat ions on the use that can be made of this research ; but 
it has some virtures as well . In particular , the two cases 
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reveal striking differenc e s ;  the very magnitude o f  the contrast 
makes the cases useful in the generat ion o f  hypotheses . The 
Ghanain producers ended up confronting markets in which prices 
were at best set by c ompet i t ive f orces and at worst set against 
t hem. By contrast ,  the large-scale commercial farmers of 
Kenya rarely confronted free market prices in the maj o r  markets 
o f  interest to them; more often, they engaged in price-set t ing 
behavior and manipulated prices to  their advantage . Insof ar 
as I can isolate those factors which appear to account for 
these d ivergent outcome s ,  then I may well have isolated factors 
which allow me to analyze instances where the interest s  of 
producers were neither so c learly triumphant as were those o f  
the sett ler farmers o f  Kenya nor s o  ill-treated a s  were those 
of the cocoa farmers of Ghana . And insofar as I can analyze the 
role of organized intere s t s  in manipulating the agricultural 
economies of these t wo colonies , I will then have enhanced our 
insight into the way in which the polit ical process operat ed to 
d e termine the pattern o f  agrarian development . The purpose o f  
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the paper is thus well served by the select ion of case materials . 2 
Presentation 
Part II of the paper is evidential in nature . It b r ie f ly 
describes the maj or marke t s  faced by the t wo groups of producers 
and notes the maj or d istort ions, insofar as they existed, that 
prevailed in each . These markets include the market s for the 
products which they supplied . In analyzing these marke t s ,  I 
attempt to infer the allocat ion of the benefits which resul ted 
from the d istortions which are introduced in them . This section 
of the paper thus attempts to establish the standing of the 
t wo c lasses of producers both relative to each other and to  
o ther segments of  their respect ive industries . 
In Part III , I move from evidence to explanat ion . 
Par t I II examines the role of factors that appear to promo te 
or frustrate the capacity of groups to form. It  examines 
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the role of the struc t ure and operat ion of colonial polit ical 
inst itut ions ; the effect of the composition of the relevant group s ;  
and the effect o f  the nature o f  the commodities themselves . These 
factors , I argue, influence the costs and b enefits of group formation 
and thus the relative ability of segments of the industry, including the 
producers themselves , to organiz e ,  to introduce distortions in the 
maj or markets ,  and thereby to capture the gains to be made from the 
production and market ing of agricultural commodities . 
II . THE MAJOR MARKETS FACING PRODUCERS 
Inputs into Farming 
Commercial farming requires access to factors of 
product ion . In this sect ion I will examine and compare the 
condit ions under which they were acquired . 3 
Labor . One o f  the maj or contrasts between the t wo cases arises 
in the market for labor . We know a lot about the relationship 
that t he Kenyan commercial farmer bore to the market for labor;  
we  know very lit t le about that o f  the Ghanaian cocoa farmer . 
The apparent reason is ins truct ive . The behavior of the settler 
farmers is well known because they struggled against the wage 
rate set in the private market and repeatedly entered the public 
arena in attempt s  to set prices advantageous to themselves ; their 
b ehavior is thus a mat ter of public record . By contras t ,  the 
Ghanaian cocoa f armers rarely, if ever, lef t  the private sector 
to advance their wage demands . 
Much of the polit ics o f  the early period of Kenya 
revolved around attempts to lower the supply price of labor . 
The commercial farmers sought to limit compet ition for labor 
from the governmen t and the railway; this is revealed in their 
repeated e f forts to limit the quan t i t y  of  government hiring -­
something which occas ionally forced the government to import 
workers . The settler farmers sought to  limit the access o f  
Afr ican farm f amilies to  land . Thus, the land commit tee o f  1905,  
which was dominated b y  commercial farmers ,  urged that the 
government confine the farming right s of natives to explicitly 
demarcated reserves and " forecast tha t normal growth would 
result in an African populat ion in excess of the physical 
carrying capac ity of  the reserved areas . Such persons would 
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then be available to enlarge the labor supply of the European 
farmers" (Wolf f ,  p .  98) . The European farmers also sought to 
limit the variety of crops gro wn on native farm lands, and did 
so at  least  in part to  depress the price of labor .  As Van 
Zwanenberg notes, "the st imulation o f  co t ton-gro wing by the 
[sub s i stence farmers ] by the o f f icials of the Administration 
was severely criticized by [ the commercial farmers ]  which argued 
that ' the cotton growing and the results accruing therefrom, 
carried to the extent which is has b een in Uganda is very 
detrimental to the welfare of  the native and means undoubt ed 
ruin to the European farming community . • . .  [We ] therefore 
urge • . the government both in the Colony and at Home to
desist from encouraging the nat ive to gro w cotton .  . . ' " 
(Van Z wanenberg, 197 4) . 
Through political action, the farmers imposed taxes 
on the nat ive populat ion so as to increase the willingness o f  
sub s istence f arm families to  work in the commercial sector . As 
one leading o f ficial phrased i t ,  " we consider that taxation 
is compelling the nat ive to leave his Reserve for the purpose 
of seeking wor k  . . . •  [ Through taxat ion ] the cost of  living 
[ can ] be increased for the nat ive, and • it is on this 
that the supply of  labour and the pr ice of  labour depends" 
(Wolff, p .  9 9 ) . And in one o f  the most notorious events in the 
ear ly poli t ic s  of  the colony, the farmers secured the support 
of the public administ rat ion in recruiting labor for their private 
enterpr ise s ;  the potential for coercion was apparent to all, and 
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was occasionally reali zed . 4 In all of these ways, largc>-sca lt• comme rcial 
producers soueht to extract a labor supply from the subsis t ence 
sector at  a price below the one that was being set by the uncon-
s trained operation of the labor market . 
By contras t with the marke t for labor in Kenya , we know very 
lit t le about the labor market in Ghana. The cocoa producers s imply 
never organized concerted act ion to alter market cond itions to their 
advantage . Instead , t hrough "share-cropping" types o f  arrangements 
(the abusa system) and the hiring of migrant labor from the terri­
t ories to the north , they obtained their labor through arrangements 
privately arrived at in the marketplace . The major reasons for 
the contrasting behavior of the Ghanian and Kenyan c ash-crop pro­
ducers in the labo r  market underlie the differences in the ir behavior 
in other markets as well, and so will be discussed in a later section . 
But i t  may be inst ruct ive to note one set of factors that affect 
t his market in particular : the different relationships between the 
COlllDlercial and sub s is t ence sectors in the two agricultural economies . 
An intere s t ing feature of the c ocoa industry is that food
and cash-crop product ion appear not to be compe t i t ive produc tive 
a c t ivities ; rather, they appear to be complementary . Thus , in 
e s t ab lishing cocoa farms, food crops, such as platains , cocoyams , 
and peppers are used to provide shading for the young cocoa trees 
(see P .  S .  Hanmiond ) .  Young cocoa trees require very little care; 
reports on the early years o f  the indust ry implied that the young 
t rees were s imply lef t  to grow in a natural way in small clearings 
in the forest . Because they required little extra care , and because 
cocoa production was complementary to food production, the cocoa 
farmers felt little need to bid labor inputs away from sub s i s t ence 
ac tiv i ti e s .  
Once established , the cocoa farms possessed another important 
property: the ir peak period of labor demand, wh ich takes place at the 
t ime of the main harves t  (November-February) , complemen ts , as opposed 
to  rivals , the period of  the peak demand for labor in the product ion 
of food crops . In the case of cereals , the demand for labor reaches 
its maximum at the time of weeding and harvesting. These periods 
fall in May to July and February to March respectively in the grain 
growing areas immediately to the north of the fores t ;  and t he further 
north the area , the later in the year these periods arise . In the 
case o f  root crops , whi ch are grown in the forest itself , there is 
no peak period of  demand for labor ; root crops can simply be s tored 
in the ground . Once e stablished , the cocoa farms thus rarely face 
the maximum market price for labor . The commercially oriented 
cocoa industry could thus comfortably coexist with the marke t for 
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labor in the subsistence sector (Bernard Riley , Personal Communication) . 
The case of Kenya was different , however .  In developing 
their estate s ,  the connnercial farmers did in fact successfully use 
subsis tence production as an input into the growth of cash crops ; they 
simply "al lowed" African farmers to ut ilize their rotational forms 
o f  subs istence food product ion on their commercial farm sites as a 
means of clearing them of bush. But unlike the cocoa producers , the 
s e t t lers t hemse lves specialized in the produc tion of food c rops ; and 
once the i r  farms were established , then the product ion cycle o f  their 
Table 1 .  
Ghana Cocoa Exports, 1900-1915 
Average value 
Quant ity Value f . o . b .  per ton f .  o .  b .  
(000 tons) (b 000) (b) 
1900 0 . 536  27 . 3 51 
1901 0 . 9 80 4 2 . 8 44 
1902 2 . 40 94 . 9  40 
1 9 0 3  2 . 28 86 . 2  38 
1904 5 . 11 200 39 
1 9 0 5  5 . 09  187  37 
1906 8 . 9 7  336 37 
1 9 0 7  9 . 36 5 1 5  5 5  
1 9 0 8  1 3 . 0  541 42 
1909 20 . 1  7 5 5  38 
1 9 10 22 . 6 86 7 38 
1911 39 . 7 1613 41 
1912 38 . 6  1643 43  
1913 50 . 6  2489 49 
1 9 14 52 . 9  2194 41 
1 9 1 5  7 7  . 3 3651 47 
Sourc e :  Polly Hill .  The Gold Coast Cocoa Farmer.  London : 
University Press ,  1956 , p .  1 3 2 .  
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comme rcial farms precisely matched that of the subsistence producers . 
To se cure a labo r  supply they therefore had to bid against the peak 
period price of labor. In this sense, the commercial farmers of 
Kenya faced a less favorable labor market than did their counterparts 
13 
in Ghana , and so had stronger incentives to seek to override the opera-
t ions of that market 
Lan d .  In analyzing the relat ive economic fate o f  producers 
in Ghana and Kenya, we cannot merely analyze the operation of the land 
market and the way in which its performance influenced the benefits 
to be derived from cash-crop production . Rather, we must analyze the 
e s tab lishment of the market in the first place ; and this entails 
s t udying the creation o f  rights in land. 
The history o f  Kenyan land law is a complex one. Essentially, 
however,  it developed in three stage s .  The first was the a lienation 
of land from indigenous to colonial j urisdiction. This was achieved 
in the 1899 ruling by law o fficers of the Crown on behalf of the 
foreign o f f ice that all waste lands and lands not under actual occupa-
t ion in Kenya were Crown lands, and therefore alienab le under terms 
and condi t i ons to be devised by th e colonial state, which was the 
agent of the Crown in East Africa.  Because of the famines of the 
1880s and 1890s , and the pes t ilences that followed each, the 
indigenous population of both people and livestock in Kenya had 
declined precipitately j ust prior to the incursion of the Europeans ; 
many lands were therefore unoccupied . In addition, the technology 
of local producers was such that at any given time a large percentage 
of the land actually being farmed would appear to be unused. Because 
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o f  t h e  recent loss o f  pop ulation and bec ause of t h e  nature o f  subs is tence 
technology, when the c o lonial government app lied the definit ion 
of Crown lands devised by i t s  legal o f f i cials , it therefore b rought 
enormous quantit ies of land under its jurisdi c t ion. The laws of 
Kenya thus allowed the uncompensated expropriat ion of large quan t i t ies 
o f  land from the sub s i stence sector.
The question then arose :  under what conditions would this 
land b e  alienated? A key i ssue underlying this question was the 
degree to which the s t at e , which now held the r ight s  to  land , as 
opposed to the c omme r c i al operators , who wished to put i t  into produc­
t ion, would cap ture the rents to be derived from the growing value 
of this factor. This i ssue arose in the form of debates concerning 
the length of the leases the s t at e  was w i lling to grant private users; 
the rental prices i t  would charge for leases; the f requency with 
whi ch i t  could revise these rents; and the degree to  which the leases 
would be freely t r ansf e r ab le once they were ass i gned to private 
individuals . 
I t  is extremely d i f ficult to determine what an equilibrium 
mixture of rental prices , lease lengths , and frequency of rent revisions 
would be.  All we know f or certain is  that in the f inal legislation 
( th e  Lands Ordinance of 1915),  the le ases were much longer ,  the rents 
lower , and the number of p ermissib le rent revis ions les s  frequent than 
the s t ate had init i ally proposed; as Sorrenson s t ates , "The 19 15 
Ordinance was an almo s t  complete victory by the settlers and the local 
o f f icials who supported them" (Sorrenson, p. 146 ) . Because of
t he potential for strategic behavior in this situat ion ,  as well as
the potential for mistaken j udgement s ,  the initial s t and of the 
s t ate does not p rovide insight into its  actual maximum; as a con-
sequence , neither does it give much insight into how the final legisla­
t ion apportioned the b ene f i ts between the s t ate and the private 
sector . More informat ive , perhaps , is that the Ordinance allowed the 
free t rans fer in the private market of  lands leased by the s t ate to 
private individuals; were the value of the land to rise more rap idly 
than the revision in ren t s  to be paid to the s t ate , private indivi-
duals could then appropriate the d i fferenc e ,  and this is app arently 
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what in f ac t  h appened.5 Las t ly , we also know that a very high percent age 
of  the land that was leased by the European f armers was in f act  not
put into immediate produc t ion , but rather held for future use or 
s ale; figures from the e ar ly 19 20s show less than f ive percent o f  the 
land leased by private users had been put into cultivation (Wolf f ,  
p .  60; N .  Leys , p .  279).  I t  would therefore appear that the commercial 
f armers secured a structure of  land law that lef t  them in a position 
to c apture a large proportion of the rents which were to be generated 
by the growing returns to cash-crop prodution. 
In the process of e s t ablishing land rights in Kenya, then 
land was secured in a manner that allowed the commercial producers , 
as opposed to the subsistence producers or the s t at e ,  to cap ture the 
rents created by the growing of commercial agriculture. By contrast 
with Kenya ,  the estab lishment of land rights in Ghana did not involve 
a forceful redis t ribut ion of land from subsistence to commercial 
producers. Rather , the conmlercial producers had to fully compensate 
at free market prices those who controlled access to this product ive 
res ource . 
Prior to the rise o f  the cocoa indus try , much o f  the land of  
the fore s t  was in fact  vacant and unutilized. Such "was t e "  lands 
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were held a s  "stool" lands : that is , they did not belong to any private 
individual or family , and access to them was regulated by the " s too l , "  
i . e .  by the chief . With the growth in demand for primary products , 
there arose a demand for rights to the fores ts  of the interior . People 
from the coas t were the best  informed concerning the opportunities 
for production for the world market . And it was commercially oriented 
coastal people who j o urneyed inland and obtained concessions from the 
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chiefs for land rights in the fores t s . 
Some of these coastal entrepreneurs were already wealthy. 
Busine s s men like Robert Hutchinson , who worked for Swanzy , and lawyers 
s uch as Joseph Brown were prosperous members of the coastal e lite; 
and through their purchase of  the leases to inland gold deposits  and 
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cocoa farms , they increased their fortunes . Others possessed more 
modest endowments . In par t icular , many of those who purchased cocoa 
lands were not of  very great wealth , and in fact had to pool their 
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assets and borrow to secure farm lands in the fore s t .  In any case , 
the growth of the opportunities for wealth in the interior in fact 
led to the exchange of land for cash. Some o f  the primary agents 
in this exchange were the chief s .  And b riefed by the coastal 
lawyers , they virtually transformed the collect ive property of the 
forest tribes -- the stool lands -- into private property : mining 
concessions , lumber concession , and private farms . 
Rather than support ing the formation of private property 
righ t s  in the in terior , the colonial government sought to forestall 
it.  The government feared th e depredation of the forest; it pro-
tes ted agains t the "corruption" of collec tive rights ; it sought 
to conserve timber resources ; and it sought to protect the inland 
chiefs  and tribes from being "robbed by the concession hunters . "  
Moreover , the government was uncertain o f  the legal status o f  many 
o f  the con cessions made outside the structure of Briti sh law. It  
therefore sought , through a series of  lands b i lls , to appropriate to 
the st ate the "waste" or unused lands of  the interio r ,  and thus t o  
b ring i t  within the legal framework to which it  was accustomed. 
These measures were vigorously resi sted by both the chiefs and the 
coastal entrepreneurs. Thus , Hancock, discussing test imony given 
to a commission to inves tigate the land "problem , "  notes that "every 
chie f and every African lawyer who gave evidence before the commission 
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expressed complete satisfact ion with the flourishing trade in concession s . 
' It is b eneficial all round , '  declared the pres ident of the Aborigenes 
Protect ion Society" -- the political movement organized to res ist the 
lands legislat ion (W. K. Hancock, p .  185) . 
Following defeat of the land b i lls , the colonial government 
introduced further measures which would allow it either to appropriate 
the remaining unused lands or to control the circums tances under 
which they were leased or sold. In the end , all such measures failed 
save two : one that helped preserve fores t reserves and one which 
allowed for the registrat ion of exchanges of  land rights , and thus 
secured the enforceab i lity by territorial law of  rights in private 
property ( see discussion in Kimb le) . 
By contrast with the development of land law in Kenya,  then , 
the es tab l ishment o f  land rights in Ghana entailed no confiscation 
of land from subsistence producers and no appropriation of land rents 
b y  conunercial p roducer s .  Rather , in securing land , the conunercial 
users found thems e lves operating in wh at was virtually a private 
market and they had to compensate at the going market rate those who 
cont rolled access to sub s istence lands . Moreover , 
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the market in land seemed to operate efficiently .  At the very 
leas t ,  it did not fun c t ion in a way that conferred a significant 
subsidy upon the agricultural producers , as had b een the case in 
Kenya. 
Transportat ion. Another maj or input was transportation . 
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries , the form o f  
transport that mos t  s ignificantly affected t h e  p rofitability of 
inland farm produc tion was the railway . The evidence suggests that 
the railway in Kenya was run with a high regard for the interests  
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of the European c o nunercial farmers; they secured many of the advantages 
of this service and the costs of providing it were distributed 
in a way that enhanced the relat ive profitability of farming. By 
contras t ,  railway f ac ilit ies in Ghana appear to h ave b een constructed 
with the interes t s  of other sectors primarily in mind ; and the cocoa 
farmers appear t o  h ave b een compelled to pay a price for t ransport 
services that lay above the competitive market rate , with the result 
that the relat ive profitability of farming declined . 
As is well known, the initial location o f  the railway in 
Kenya was not chosen with economic obj ectives in mind ; rather , it 
reflected the polit ical imperatives of the c olonial rivalries between 
the Brit ish, French and Germans in East Africa -- rivalries that 
gave st rategic importance to controlling the headwaters of the Nile . 
More informative is the later select ion of the location of extension 
and s pur lines .  One of the first and most  important was the route 
for the extension of the railway into Uganda. While such apologists 
for the c onunercial farmers as Elspeth Huxley debate the point 
(Huxley , 195 3 ,  vol. II, pp. 9 5  ff) , th e Director of Public Works 
in Kenya at the time persuasive ly argued that the route was chosen out 
of a regard for the benefits which it conferred on the land holdings 
of s ome of the largest commercial farmers in the territory (Ross , 
chapter 14) . In the 1920s, the railway , with government b ac king, 
b orrowed hl7 million to develop other spur lines . One account 
sugges t s  that over seventy-three percent of the total mileage o f  
these extens ions ran through the connnercial farming areas (Bre t t , 
pp.  200 f f ;  see also M. F. Hill; Gibb ) .  By the end of the 1920s , 
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the cons truct ion of spur lines had b rought nearly all of the conunercial 
f armers wi thin twen ty-five miles of the railway (Hinga and Heyer) .  
Uhile locational dec is ions in Kenya reveal the emphasis 
placed on the development of the commercial farming secto r ,  those 
in Ghana sugge s t  that priority was p laced on the development of 
other indus tries , and in particular on the deve lopment of mining.  
In 189 3 ,  the British Government dispatched one J. I. Lang to Ghana 
to survey pos sible routes for rail lines in that territory. Lang ' s  
report offered two candidates :  one that would open up the forest 
zone , which already was showing every evidence of developing into 
a prosperous f arming region , and another that would promo te the 
development of the mining centers in the wes t .  Subsequent s tudies 
b ased on Lang ' s  report in fact advocated the development of the first 
of these routes; but following a visit of  the governor t o  the mining 
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centers in 189 6 ,  the wes tern route was chosen ( Church , pp . 129 f f ) . 
Two decades later , a s imilar cho ice was made , this with respect to 
the locat ion of a deep water port to serve as a terminus for the 
railway . Because of its natural geological structure , the bay 
at Takoradi qualified as the least cos tly site for such a harbor; 
but , being located in the west ,  while the major centers of  cocoa 
product ion lay in the eas t , it was not clear that Takoradi provided 
the port site that would generate the greatest economic bene f i t s . 
Nonetheless , the government chose that location ( see the d is cussion 
in Kay). 
It  should be noted that in its subsequent management of the 
harbor facility , the government revealed not only a willingness to 
favor the mines by comparison with the cocoa farmers ,  but also a 
wil l ingness to favor the development of the mines at their expense . 
In constructing Takoradi harbor , the government built on t oo grand 
a scale , and the unit cost s  of using the facility therefore proved 
much greater than had been expected. For a while , the government 
contemplated closing the central and some of the eastern ports so 
as to force agricultural exports through Takoradi;  while it abs tained 
from taking that measure it did in fact restrict road trans port so 
as to force the cocoa crop onto the rail routes that emp loyed 
Takoradi as their principal terminus . The result was to increase the 
volume of  goods pass ing through the harbor -- a measure that allowed 
the governmen t to hold down port charges levied on the mines and 
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other users but which achieved this result at  the expense o f  the 
cocoa farmers (Church , pp . 147 ff and Kay , pp. 137  f f ) . 
Thus far we have looked �t the pat tern o f  locational deci-
sions and the distribution of services , and we have argued that they 
tended to confer benef its primarily to the collllllercial farmers in 
Kenya but to nonagricultural users of these services in Ghana. As has 
already b een suggested , this pattern extended as wel l  to the alloca-
t ion of the costs of  transport . 
Three major features of the rating structure o f  the Kenyan 
railways are relevant to this analys is . One was the " country produce" 
provision : an item, if  produced locally , was carried at a lower 
rate than the same item if produced abroad . As in the early years 
of  the century mos t  local product ion took place in the agricultural
sector , the primary bene ficiaries of this provision were the farmers . 
For any given item, the magnitude of the benefits was greater the 
larger the volume of marketed production; so within the farming 
collllllunity itsel f ,  it was the large-scale farmers -- i . e .  the European 
sett lers who benefited the most from this p rovis ion . 
A second important provis ion was the ins t itut ion of a 
f lat rate for the t ransport of maize.  By contrast with the p revious 
rate schedule , under which the rate charged maize was sens i t ive 
to the length of the haul , under the new rate schedule, the rate 
charged maize was not; and the difference between the old and new 
rates was such that the farmers experienced a raise in the export 
price for this collllllodity . Th is  effect was more pronounced for the 
inland producers , such as the cereals growe rs in Trans Nzoia and 
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Uasin Gishu; and again , the bene f its were greater the larger the 
volume o f  produce. A third feature o f  the railway charges deserves 
note :  within the class of  imported goods , agricultural inputs were 
transp orted at a lower fee than were the inputs for other industries. 
Thus , imports of  farm machinery were c harged a lower rate than were 
imports of other kinds of machine equipment; and among agricultural 
producers , it was the European farmers who could afford these farm 
machines.  The s tructure of  rai lway rates was thus used to protect 
and promote the fortunes of  the large-scale , European producers 
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(Gibb , Brett, Hinga and Heyer). 
It is more difficult to analyze the case of  Ghana. In 
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Kenya , the rate schedule was exp l ic itly designed to fulfill a political 
mandate a mandate which advocated the reduction of freight 
c harges and even the incurring of losses in the running of the railway 
to ful f i l l  "deve lopment" objectives. The existence and incidence 
of sub sidies was thus transparent. In addition , the way in which 
this policy was implemented o f ten gave rise to more than one rate 
for a particular item, and so we d id not need to concern 
ourselves with the possib ility that differences in the freight 
c harges would me rely reflect dif ferences in the real costs o f  
transportation.  In the case o f  Ghana , however , the task of inference 
is more dif ficult . There was no pol itical mandate to use sub sidized 
transport as an ins trument for development;  and for any single commodity , 
there was but one rate c harged for any given distance. In the absence 
of knowledge of the real costs of transpor ting different commodities , 
inferences thus have to be b ased on information other than those of  
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the pub lished rate charges . Fortunate ly , we do have other kinds 
o f  in formation , and it suggests that transport was furnished to the 
cocoa farmers at a price that lay above the real costs of providing 
such services. 
The principal evidence is contained in the response of  the 
government and the railways to the growth of  road transport.  Lorries 
have been imported into Ghana since early in the century . Following 
World War I ,  however ,  there was a boom in road transportation. 
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Conune rcial f irms and private entrepreneurs imported light vehicles 
f rom the United States -- vehicles that were able to use the poor roads 
of the cocoa region without great damage to the roads or to themselves . 
For certain services, these lorries provided transport at a cost that 
was considerably cheaper than that c harged by the railway ; this 
d i fferential was particularly pronounced for s hort hauls , with 
the result that muc h  cocoa traffic shifted from the railway to the 
roads along those portions of  the railway that lay near the coastal 
ports . 
What is interesting about the divers ion of cocoa traf fic to 
road transport was the government' s response to it. The government 
passed regulations banning the transport by road of cocoa over routes 
running parallel to the railway and built barriers and posted 
inspectors at c heck points to implement the measure. Moreover ,  where 
the government had begun to build roads that ran parallel to the 
railway , it stopped , with the result that Ghana was long characterized 
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by a segmented road network. The cocoa farmers were thus compelled 
to consume the more expensive mode of transportation -- the railway --
and they could not acquire transport services at the competitive 
market price. 
In acquiring transport services, then, the commercial 
f ar mers of Kenya had access to  a rail system which was designed to 
provide them with convenient services and which utilized a s truc ture 
o f  rates which was designed to protect the profi t ab ility of their
enterprises ; the magnitude of many of these bene f i t s  increased with 
the volume of produc t i on and so were concentrated on the large-s c ale 
European farmers . By con t ras t ,  the Ghanai an producers had access to 
a rail system which was designed primarily to b ene f i t  other sec tors 
o f  the economy ; and they were compelled to pay a price for transport
services that lay above the price that would have prevailed in a 
c ompetitive market .  
Capital. There is  a last market for inputs that should be 
d i scussed : the market for capital .  Unfortunat e ly , even b y  comparison 
with the markets for land , l abor , and transport services , we h ave 
l i t t le knowledge about the way in which capital was acquired by the 
f arming interests ; and what knowledge we do have suggests  a rather 
c omplex state of af f airs . 
The principal sources o f  capital for cocoa producers appear 
to have been either the local purchasing agents -- those who bought 
from the farmers and s o ld to  the merchant houses who exported the 
crop 
1 9 6 3). 
or other cocoa f armers (United Kingdom, 1938 ; Hill , 1956 and 
In the c ase o f  the f ormer , the f armers ob t ained credit by 
selling forward;  they would rece ive cash in return for a promise 
to deliver an agreed upon quant ity of  output to the lending cocoa 
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purchaser. In the c ase of  the latter, one f armer would "pledge" 
his f ar m  to  another . Under this system, in exchange for a cash 
loan ,  the borrower would allow the lender to operate one or more 
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of his cocoa f arms for a s t ated period of time . The lender would harves t  
and sell the output o f  the f arm over the agreed duration o f  the pledge, 
and the revenues realized over that period would const itute repay-
ment for the loan (Hill, 1956). To be noted is that there was no 
special class of  money lenders in the f arming community and that the 
evidence sugge sts that "creditors must b e  nearly as numerous as 
deb tors" (Hill , 1956 , p. 56); there thus appears to have b een a 
c o mpe titive market . 
In the case of both markets , then , the interest rate was a 
random variab le ,  and a principal determinant of its value was the 
price which the cocoa crop commanded from the export houses . In 
the c ase of loans by local purchasers , the interest r ate depended 
on the proceeds they realized when they sold the crop to the export 
houses. In the case of  "pledged" f arms , the amount of the loan , the 
yield of the f arm that was to be managed by the creditor , and the 
duration of  the transfer of  management rights were prenegot iated ; 
the rate o f  intere s t ,  then , once again , was largely determined b y  
t h e  revenues realized from the sale of  t h e  output of  the f arm. And 
divergent expectat ions about future prices formed an import ant b asis 
for this market (Hill , 1956 , p. 5 2). 
A full analysis of the structure and operations o f  the market 
for credit in Ghana must then be b ased on an apprai s al of the market 
for products.  As we shall see in the next section , the degree 
of compet i t iveness in this market varied over time . From t ime to 
t ime, the maj or purchasing f irms agreed to restrict competit ion for 
the cocoa crop; and when they d id, the result , naturally , was a 
reduction in the price of the commodity . There were major dif ferences 
in the short- and long-term e f fects of this act ion . 
In the market for credit , the short-run effect of collusion 
among the purchasers of the crop was to reduce the rat e  of interes t .  
For i f  t wo f armers had negot i ated a transact ion in which cash was 
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exchanged for r ights to the output of a given f arm , then the implement a­
tion of an agreement to hold down the price of cocoa reduced the 
v alue of the f arm to the creditor and allowed the b orrower t o  s ecure 
h i s  c ash more cheap ly . S imilarly, if a f armer received c ash from 
a local purchaser by means of selling forward , and if the export 
houses then conspired to reduce the s ales value of this produce, then 
the former would have secured a reduction in the rate of interes t he 
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h ad to p ay for his loan . 
Conf ining our attention solely to the market for inputs ,  
we c an then conclude that when collus ion took place in the Ghana 
cocoa marke t ,  its immediate e f fect was to benefit borrowers and to 
penalize lenders . Insofar as much of the borrowing and lend ing 
took p lace among the f armers themselves ,  the e f fect was thus to 
redis tribute income within that community ; its imp act was thus 
neutral as b e tween producers and o ther groups . And insofar as the 
f armers b orrowed from local purchasers , the immediate impact of 
collus ion on the c ap i t al market was beneficial to the f armers who h ad 
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s o ld forward . 
Whether or not the farmers bene fit ted , ne t ,  from collus ion 
is of course an entirely different mat te r .  But in this perverse c ase 
the re striction of competition on the p art of other agents in one of 
the maj or markets faced by the f armers h ad an immedi ate effect 
on the price of their inputs that was either neutral in t erms of the 
relative s t anding of producers vis-a-vis other groups in the industry 
or favorab le to at le ast a maj or port ion of them. As soon as the 
t ime period is broadened , however , the negative effects dominate . 
Not only is there a downward adj us tment in produce prices ; but also , 
inso f ar as prices for output were depressed by the purchasers ' cartel 
for more than one season , or insof ar as economic agents p erceived 
that to be the case , then, for a given level of output , lenders 
would advance less c ash.  In the long run , not only did collusion 
result in a los s  of revenues ; but also, in physical terms it thus 
resulted in an increase in th e costs of capital. 
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During periods of competitive cocoa buying,  then , the 
Ghanaian f armer paid a price for c apital that was set in a competitive 
marke t ,  and the market price of c apital was a random variab le . During 
periods in whi ch the f armer f aced a cocoa buying cartel , he had 
to give up a greater amount of his crop to secure a f i xed amount of 
c ash . S ave for very short-term periods following the imposition 
of c artels,  then , the f armers never f aced a rate of interest that 
offered a s ubs idized price for b orrowing. 
The settler f armers of Kenya ,  by contrast , achieved such a 
subs idy . We know very little about the early capital market in Kenya, 
p articularly that utilized by the cere als producers . We do know that 
persons like De lamere b orrowed extensively on the private market 
in England , using his f amily estates as collateral; we have no 
compar able information for "lesser" figures.  But we know that in 
later periods, particul ar ly in the 1920 s ,  the cereals farme rs did 
b orrow extensively in the connnercial marke t ,  with the b anks accept ing 
mortgages on their f arm l ands for securi ty. With the ons e t  o f  the 
depression, however ,  land values declined and the connnerical b anks 
radical ly increased the p r ice they charged borrowers in order to  
compensate for the decline in the security of their loans . The 
costs  of b orrowing increased ,  and in response ,  the government entered 
the loans market .  Beginning with a series o f  seasonal loans to  
cereals farmers , the government formed a land b ank t o  make medium­
and long-term loans at s ub s id ized rates of interest . Unlike their 
Ghan aian counterpar t s ,  the connnercial farmers of Kenya thus c ame to 
operate in a cap i t al market in which they were charged prices that 
were set well below the market price. And the manipulat ion o f  prices 
in this market allowed them, other things being equal, to  operate 
more profitably. Indeed , th e consensus appears to  b e  that without 
government intervent i on in the capital marke t ,  the maj ority o f  the 
s e t tlers would have d e faul ted during the depression , and have been 
f o rced to  surrender their f arms (Van Zwanenberg , 1 9 7 2 , p. 1 9 ;  Hinga 
and Heyer , p .  2 30). 
The Market for Output 
There thus exi s t ed distortions in the marke t s  for input s  
f o r  which we have information which worked to  the advantage of the 
s e tt ler farmers in Kenya; we have found none which worked to the 
advan t age of their counterparts in Ghana and several that worked to 
their disadvant age . The Kenyan producers appear to have enj oyed 
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c onsiderable subsidization in their acq uisit ion of  land , labor and 
transpor t ,  while the Ghanaian producers at best paid the compet itive 
market prices and at wors t  p aid prices which contained monopsony 
premia. The relative s t anding of the two classes of producers in 
the market for inputs also characterizes their s t anding in the market 
for their product s .  For in this market , the large-scale cereals 
producers organized a mechanism for colluding in an e f fort to force 
a rise in the price of cereals; by contras t ,  the Ghanaian f armers 
f aced cartels organized by purchasers and shippers of their produc ts 
car tels which sought t o  depress the prices received by the producers 
of cocoa. 
From an early period , the Kenyan settlers attemp ted to 
promote the marketing of their products.  The basic ins trument of 
their ef forts was the Kenya Farmers ' Associat ion -- an organization 
first formed in the 1912-13 crop year to help dispose of the maize 
crop. The As sociation marke ted wheat as we ll. I t  devised several 
t actics to promote its objectives . The Associat ion gave political 
support to the p assage of regulat ions that made the provision of 
maize rations compulsory for all employers of labor -- and then 
signed bulk delivery agreements with the two largest employers : 
the government and the railways. It helped to organize , finance , 
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and manage processing mills for the cereals produced by its members . 
The Association also lobbied for , and got , a mixture of policy measures 
which helped it in its efforts to.raise the domestic price of grains : 
import duties behind which to she lter the domestic price and the use 
of public funds to assist in the disposal of surplus product ion at 
a loss in foreign markets. 
A major d i f ficulty in inflating the domestic price was 
e stab lishing e f fective collus ion among the producers themselves .  I t  
was d i f f icult to prevent price competition among the members of  
the As sociation ; as  Huxley noted , "Members were all too ap t to sell 
their crops through the As sociation only when it pleased them" ( 195 7 , 
p .  74).  And those outside the Association could of course take 
advantage o f  the higher price established by it;  they could undercut 
that price and so increase their sales . Particularly troublesome 
in this regard were the sub sistence producers . Responding to higher 
p rices , they rapidly turned to supplying the commerical market; 
as Huxley notes , as e arly as 19 13 these new entrants "had taken to 
growing maize with surprising enthusiasm and the local markets were 
glutted" ( 195 7 ,  p. 4), Without legal b acking , there was little the 
Association could do e i ther to compel cooperation by its own members 
or to exclude new entrants. 
The Association's response was to seek the support o f  the 
state .  Two periods o f  politi cal crisis provided the opportunity 
f o r  its e fforts : the depression and the Second World War . In 
response to the threat posed to the commeri cal f arming sector by the 
depression , the Association secured a critical piece o f  protective 
legislation ( the Marketing of Native Produce Act) which strengthened 
its ab ility to control the behavior of the subsistence producers . 
This act provided for the regulation o f  the purchase o f  products 
grown by "subsistence" producers through the issuance of  permits and 
licenses. In particular , the act was used to allow the Kenya Farme r s '
As sociation to purchase Afr ican produce and to exclude private 
30 
entrepreneurs from that market, particularly the "Asian merchants 
who bought extremely cheaply, and often without mercy , in the 
reserves" (Huxley , 195 7 ,  p. 116). Through the power conferred by 
this act, the large-sc ale producers came to dominate the purchasing 
and marketing of  the output of the small-scale producers ,  and so 
controlled the c apacity of  new entrants to undercut the prices they 
s ought to achieve through collusion on the domestic marke t.
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There remained the problem of  restraining the competitive 
behavior of the members of the Association . Again the depress ion 
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provided impetus for the securing of legislation to promote the interests 
of producers .  One such measure was an act which gave legal under-
pinning to bylaws enacted by cooperative societies . This act was 
used to compel wheat growers to market exclusively through the Kenya 
Farmers' Association . In addition , through the Sale o f  Wheat 
Ordinance , the Government obligated every f armer to market his wheat 
through an o f f icially designated agency ; the agency appointed was the 
Kenya Farmers' Association. 
A second major crisis -- World War II -- provided 
maize producers with comparable mechanisms for curtailing 
competition . During the war , the government o f  Kenya agre ed to supply 
British forces in the Mideast with bulk deliveries of maize.  Under 
the terms o f  wartime legislation -- the produce control ordinances 
the government estab lished a Maize Control Board , which served as 
the sole legal buyer of  the maize crop . The first Maize Controller 
was one Co lonel Griffith -- an executive in the Kenya Farmers' 
Association . As Huxley ingenuously comments : "It was inevi tab le 
that [Colonel Gri ffith ]  should look for staf f to men he kn ew, and 
32 
who knew about maize . . . .  No less than 26 members of the K. F. A.  
s t a f f ,  at all levels , left t o  j oin Maize Control "  (19 57 , p.  137) . 
Later the Kenya Farmer s '  Associati on was made the official designated 
agent f or the purchase of maize at "a price. . • f ixed annually by
the Government on the basis of an estimated cost of p roduction" 
(Huxley, 195 7 ,  p .  1 3 7 ) .  The producers'  organizat i on thus became the 
monop oly buyer of the output of its members at legally binding prices . 
Through s t a t e  intervention , then , the producers cartelized 
the domestic market .  S ome , like William O. Jone s ,  a r e  s keptical 
about the ab ility o f  the producers to f orce a price r ise on domestic 
c onsumers of f ood c r op s . But we must evaluate such s kepticism in light of 
the fact that the d ome s t i c  price of maize in Kenya -- albeit the price 
in 195 9 , which lies c on s i derab ly out of the p er iod d iscussed in this 
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chapter -- was twice the world price . This suggests that the 
mix of policies advanced by the Kenya Farmers ' Ass ociation had 
succeeded in achieving a highly advantageous price in the d omestic 
market -- and one that given an inelast i c  demand f or this f ood product 
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would result in a r is e  in producer revenues. 
In Ghana there also t ook p lace a cartelization of the 
market f or cash c r op s ;  but , in contrast to Kenya ,  the Ghanaian cartels 
were f ormed by the purchasers and shippers of the products , and not 
by the producers themselves .  Insofar as monopoly rents were generated 
by the structure of the market f or the products of the c ommercial 
agricultural industry , then , they were extracted from ,  rather than b y ,  
t h e  producers .  
For a var iety of reasons , there emerged strong f orces 
leading to increasing returns to scale in the export and import 
business in Ghana. Foremost among them was that the risks of the 
trade were great , due to fluctuat ions in the prices of pr imary 
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products and the concomitant f luctuations in the demand f or the imports 
furnished by the c ommercial h ouses . Because of the dis tances between 
Europe and Africa , and the t ime peri od involved in transactions between 
the two areas , large amounts of cap i tal were tied up on goods in 
transit ; and the value of these s t oc ks was subj ect as well to 
p rice fluctuat i ons . Only firms which were large enough to operate 
over a large geographic area and so hedge the risks engendered by 
trading in one primary produc t ,  (e. g. , coc oa from Ghana) with variab ility 
engendered by t rading in another (e . g . , palm oil from Nigeria) were able 
in the l ong run to survive in the t rad ing business in Wes t Africa. 
In add i t ion , the commercial houses faced strong at temp ts to cartelize 
the shipping r outes be tween Europe and Africa. These efforts created 
incentives to c ombine , b oth s o  as to enhance their bargaining power 
in b ids for bet ter rates and services and so as to make credible 
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threats of entry int o the shipping busines s .  For these reasons , 
large f irms did better in the export-import business in Wes t  Africa. 
An important result was the consolidation of the merchant 
h ouses.  In the 1880s , several important trading houses merged t o  
f orm t h e  African Associat i on .  In 1919 , the es tablished f irms of 
Millers and Swanzy c ombined with the African Association to f orm 
the African and Eastern Trading Corporation Limited . And with 
the inf lux of capital from Lever Brothers into the Niger Company 
in the 1920s , this corporat ion was able to engineer a merger with the 
Afri c an and Eastern Trading Company -- one that led to the formation 
of  the largest  trading house of  them all: the United Africa
Company. By the early 1930s , then , the import and export business 
in Ghana was dominated by a few major f i rms; in 1934,  four of them 
handled over two-thirds of the total purchases of  Ghan a ' s  cocoa 
crop , and one f irm, the United Africa Comp any handled over 40 percent 
of  it ( see t ab le 2 ) . 
This pat tern of consolidation f ac ilit ated attempts to  
restrict c ompet ition .  Repeated ef forts were made t o  form purchasing 
agreement s  among the f irms and thereby lower the price of fered cocoa 
f armers for the ir products.  One inve s tigation reveals the formation 
of a t  least seven such agreements prior to  the 1930s (United
Kingdom, 1938) . The b asic principle underlying these agreements
was that e ach f irm b e  allotted a share of  the market , the relative 
shares being based on p as t  p erformance. Like all such agreements ,  
however , these e fforts at co llusion f aced a b asic problem: the 
incentives created by the attempts to  form the cartel operated in 
a way that threatened to lead to its destruct ion. For , with every 
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o ther p arty restricting their purchases , a f i rm could radically increase
its own by offering marginally better terms; and with a decline 
in prices being forced upon the f armers , new firms could enter the 
industry and capture the market by offering bet ter prices. Thus , 
it was in the interes ts of all parties to t he agreement to cheat , 
it was in the interests of new purchasers t o  enter the marke t ,  and 
the results of ei ther act ion would be an increase in price and a 
d e feat o f  the purpose for which the cartel was formed . 
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The forces operating to des t abilize the buying agreements 
were thus clear; and so too is the his torical record. The frequency 
with which the agreements were made suggests the frequency with 
which they were broken , And such new entrants into the market 
as Rac c ah , who b roke the ground nut pool in Nigeria, and Levantis , 
who was making strong inroads into the Ghanaian cocoa trade at the 
t ime of the Second World War , also underscore the vulnerab i li ty of  the 
purchasing cartels . As Hancock pungent ly phrased i t : "If  Wes t  African 
commerce is a record of imperfect competit ion , it is also a record 
of imperfect monopoly" (Hancock, p. 207) . 
As had been the c ase in Keny a ,  a period of poli t i c al cris is 
was exp loi ted to engineer the formation of an effective c artel in 
Ghana; again , i t  was World War I I  that provided the opportunity . But 
unlike the case in Kenya, i t  was the merchant houses , and not the 
producers , that seized the opportunity.  With the outbreak of the war , 
Ghana lost much of the market for its cocoa; it was cut o f f  from 
Germany , which had purchased much of its crop , and the impoundment 
of shipping for war purposes limited its access to other marke t s .  The 
Brit ish f e ared that political turmoil would break out should the 
c ocoa industry collapse . The government therefore pledged to  
purchase the Ghanaian cocoa crop in its entirety for the duration 
of  the war .  In seeking t o  implement this pledge , the government
organized the Cocoa Control Board , later called the Wes t African 
Produce Con trol Board. By s t atute , the Board was made monopoly 
buyer o f  the cocoa crop. The government chose as its o f f i cial 
agen ts the merchant houses and i t  called upon the Associat ion of 
West African Me rchants to draw up the procedures for the purchase 
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SHIPMENTS OF GOLD COAST COCOA BY THE PRINCIPAL FIRMS DUR ING SEASONS 
19 3 3- 34 to 19 36- 37 
F i rm 19 3 3- 34 19 34- 3 5 1935- 3 6  ----
i Tons Percen t  Tons Per cent I Tons Per cent 
Un i t e d  A f r i ca Co . L t d . 8 6 , 0 6 2  
Cadbury Bros . L t d . 2 3 , 736 
G . B .  O l l ivant L t d . 1 3 , 4 3 2  
Compagnie Francaise de 
l ' Afrique A c c i d entale ( 1 4 , 008
Union Trad ing Co . L t d . J 9 , 76 3
Engl ish & S co t t ish Joint
Cooperat ive Who l esale 
So c i e t y  L t d . 10 , 095 
J .  Lyons & Co . Lt d . 7 , 1 59 
Busi & St ephenson Lt d . 6 , 987 
Swiss Afri can Trad ing Co . 1 , 1 4 7  
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Un i te d  l�ingdom Government ,  Repor t of the Commission 0n the Marke t ing o f  West Afri can Cocoa , Cmd . 5845 
HMS O .  1 938) . n .  191 . 
of the c oc oa crop .  The procedures devised by the Association were 
precisely those which the merchant houses had tried to implement in 
the period of imperfect c ompet ition .  Each merchant house was 
allowed to purchase on behalf of the government its "hi s t orical 
share" of the c oc oa crop .  To be noted is that these shares were 
calculated in such a way that they s igni ficantly curtailed the share 
of at leas t one recent entrant into the indus try -- Levantis , the 
f irm whose entry into the market just prior to the war had undercut 
earlier at temp t s  to form a purchasing cartel. In 1940 , the Board 
offered producers a price which lay at 50 percent of the London spot 
price f or cocoa (Bateman 1965 , p .  1 7 8). 
Before c on c luding this sect i on ,  it  should be noted that 
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the merchant h ouses were not the only group that attempted t o  f orm car­
tels and thereby extract revenues f r om the nascent agricultural 
industry . Such e f f orts were also made by the shipping c ompanies . 
In the early days of the agricultural industry in West Africa , two 
major lines -- the Afr i can S teamship Company and the Brit ish and 
African Steam Navigation Company -- competed f or the West  African 
trade . Under the leadership of E . L . Jones , these f irms merged to 
f orm the Elder Demp s ter line. In 1 894 , Elder Demp s ter , in c oopera­
t ion with a German f i rm by the name of Woermann Lines , f ormed the 
Wes t  African shipping c onference. Through a system of deferred 
rebates , the c onference attempted to control the regional market 
f or shipping services. A rebate of ten percent would be given on the 
cost of any shipment made with a conference member if and only i f  
the party in ques t i on c on f ined all h i s  patronage t o  t h e  member 
c ompanies for a full year f ollowing the date of sh ipment . For 
a f irm doing a lot of business , s igni f icant amounts of capi tal 
would thus be lost were it to fail to ship exclus ively through the 
con ference. In this way ,  the confere.nce shippers sought control over 
the transport of producers between Wes t  Africa and its maj or external 
market s  ( see Leubusche r ,  196 3 ;  Davies ; Wils on ) .  
S ources such a s  McPhee tend t o  accord the shippers great 
market p ower .  McPhee notes the small number of natural harbors on 
the West  Coast of Africa , which make it  difficult f or tramp steamers 
t o  operate. He notes the treacherous conditions in what harbors 
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there were, and the fact that Jones put the vast majority of the local 
p i lots under c on t ract with his f irm. He notes Jones ' attempts t o  
monopolize the literage and warehouse facilities and h i s  f ounding and 
management of the major bank of West Africa -- the bank that provided 
credit  f or most of the merchant houses in the area (McPhee , pp . 91 f f ) . 
And yet there s imply is t oo much evidence of the ease of entry int o 
the shipp ing industry t o  sustain McPhee ' s  inference of significant 
market p ower by the shipping interests . Thus , we know that Jones ' 
early monopoly was broken by Woermann , and that the latter ' s  
entry is what provoked the f ormation of the conference in the first 
p lace . We know that before World War I I  Lever gained acces s to non­
con ference vessels (Davies ,  pp . 186 f f ; see also Wil s on,  chapter 1 7 ) . 
And we also know that the conference lines ' unwi llingness t o  provide 
adequate service to the Un ited Africa Company led in 1929 to the 
f ormat i on by that company of its own shipping capacity ,  with the 
result that the conference los t f orty percent of its business. 
The Ghanaian p r oducers thus eventually faced a cartel in 
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the form of government b acked collusion among the merchant hous es. 
The shipping indus try attemp ted also to form a car te l , but it f ailed . 
At no time , however ,  d id the producers themselves succeed in forming an 
institution capable of altering prices for their products to their 
advantage. 
I I I .  DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS 
Thus , we have examined the maj or markets faced by the cocoa 
producers of Ghana and the l arge-scale commercial farmers o f  Kenya, 
and we h ave comp ared the realtive standing of the two classes o f  
p roducers i n  these markets . We f ind that at best the cocoa producers 
f aced competitive marke t prices in these markets; often they f aced 
p r i ces which were set agains t  them. By contras t, the l arge-scale 
cereals growers at worst f aced competi tive market prices in the 
major markets of relevance to them; most often they were ab le to 
s e t  p ri ces in these markets to the ir advantage . 
In this section o f  the p ape r ,  I seek to explain the d ivergent 
p atterns in these two industries. In particul ar , I examine a 
s e r ies of factors which influenced the perceived costs and benefits of 
organization and I examine the way in which these fac tors he lped to 
acc ount for the relative ab i l i ty of different groups to form in defense 
of their economic inte rests. These f actors include considerations 
ari s ing from the structure and operation of colonial political 
ins titutions , from the size distribution of dif ferent segments of the 
two industries , and from the nature of the commodities produced in 
them. 
Of these factors , those arising from the structure and 
operation of colonial political institutions were fundamental ly 
important. No government run by British pub lic officials and paid 
for by British taxpayers was going to 'intervene in the cocoa industry 
to promote the interests o f  indigenous producers as Against those 
o f  British merchants and manufacturers . Nor ,  save under exceptional
circumstance s ,  was a British government in East Africa going to 
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try to undermine the interests of its own citizens in the agricultural 
indus try of that nation. The fact that the agricultural industries 
operated within a colonial political system thus had a fundamental 
b e ar ing on the ultimate distribution of the gains to be made from it. 
Despite the primacy of political considerations , I shall discuss 
them at the end rather than the beginning of this section. For 
there were other f actors at work, and , in the face of the glaring 
s ignificance of the political f act of colonialism, their importance 
is o ften ignored . Moreover ,  these nonpolitical factors tended to 
influence the desire and ab ility of organized interests to form; and it 
wa s these interests which once formed then set the colonial system 
in action. We therefore do better s tarting outside the political 
arena, in a sens e ,  and then entering it, as did the maj or groups 
themselve s in the ir efforts to use public action to advance their 
interests in the market place . 
Properties of the Commodities 
One of the maj o r  nonpolitical factors influencing the 
relative s tanding of the two c l asses of  producers were dif ferences 
in the incentives to organiz e .  A variety of factors influenced the 
incentives , but among the most impor tan t were dif ferences in the 
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c ommodities which they produced . The Kenyan farmers specialized in the 
product ion of  cereals which were largely des tined for the domestic 
marke t ; the Ghanaian farmers produced a c onfect ionary item which was 
dest ined for the world marke t .  From differences in the commodities 
which they produced there arose differences in the incentives for 
collus ive behavior ; and this is particularly true with respect to 
their incentives to collude in the market s  for products . 
Because cereals have a low value to weight rat ion, they 
are expensive to  transport . Consumers will tend to find domest ically 
produced cereals relatively cheap by comparison with those produced 
abroad . This was part icularly true for a p lace like Kenya in the 
early years of this century , for the maj or rival grain-producing 
economies were located at a considerable dis tance from the Kenyan 
market . Were the s e t t ler farmers to collude , then , and were they 
able success fully to  constrain the behavior of the African 
producers , they could then easily capture the local marke t .  I t  
was therefore reasonable for them to  believe that they could force 
a price rise upon the domestic consumer . 
Rather than producing for a relatively small home market , 
by contras t ,  the Ghanaian producers market ed their output on the world 
market ; and within that market there were alternative sources o f  
s upply . Granted that by 1911 Ghana was the larges t  producer for that 
marke t ;  and granted as well that she accounted for over f i f teen 
p ercent of the world ' s  output in that year . Nonetheless , the very 
speed of her rise to ascendancy among the world producers underscored 
the rapidity with which new entrants could undercut any attemp ts 
by Ghana to raise the price of  her cocoa. And because the mar ke t  
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faced by Ghanaian producers was worldwide and not national , the b ehavior 
of these other producers lay outside Ghana ' s  j urisdiction . In effect , 
then , the Ghanaian producers faced what appeared to be a highly elastic 
demand for their produc t ;  the incent ives to form a producers ' cartel 
were therefore weakened . 
Other differences in the commodities which the two sets 
o f  farmers produced help to account for the differences in the
s trength of the incentive to collud e .  One , of course,  is that cereals 
are widely regarded as a necessity whereas cocoa is not ; the effect 
once again is to create a relatively lower price elas ticity for the 
produc ts of the Kenyan farmers , and thereby enhance the prospects o f  
returns from col lusive behavior .  Another attribute i s  important . 
Cereals can be preserved with relative eas e ;  the farmers can s tore 
them and withhold them from the marke t .  Moreover,  they can divert 
them to  o ther uses -- their own consumpt ion or consumption by 
livestock,  for example . By contras t ,  cocoa tends to ferment and to 
spoil ,  and this is particularly true in the tropical conditions under 
which it is grown . 20 A farmer contemplating holding his crop o f f
the market thus finds that the rate o f  l o s s  due t o  deteriorat ion 
seriously o f fsets the prospective gains to be derived from an increase 
in p rice . 2
1 
In addition , cocoa has no use outside the confect ionary 
market ; it cannot be pro fitably diverted to o ther activities nor can 
it be consumed on the farm. Dif ferences in the technical properties 
of  the two c rops thus create differences in the perceived gains
and losses from collusive behavior . 
An int ere s t ing test case for th i s  analv c i �  is o f fered by the 
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behavior o f  the producers o f  export crops in Keny a ,  coffee and tea 
in p articular . Clearly ,  these producers received greater ass istance 
from the state , p ar t icularly in the form o f  research and extension 
services , than did their Ghan ai an counterparts . But it is also 
clear that they f ailed to f orm a producers lobby approaching in power 
that of the lobby formed by their cereals growing fellow nationals ; 
nor were they able to compel the government to intervene on their 
behalf t o  the degree att ained by the lat ter group . Evidence of this 
contention is  that within t he European f arming community , it was only 
the producers o f  export crops who were subject to direct t axes by the 
government .  Moreover ,  when the interest s  of the producers of food crops 
d irectly conflicted , as they did over the issue o f  the price of food 
to be supplied to the employees of the producers of export crops , the 
interests of the cereal growers prevailed . 
A variety o f  f actors is obviously at p lay in determining the 
relat ive political power of these gorups . But the p attern th at obt ains 
is in conformity with what would be expected if the nature of the commodity 
itself ,  in addition t o  the role o f  citizenship and r ace , were an impor t ant 
f ac tor in influencing the abi lity of groups to form in support of their 
economic interes t s . 22 
Propert ies of the Producers as a Group 
Another dif ference helps to account for variations in the readiness 
and ab ility of the two sets of producers to collude in defense of their 
interests . And this is the d i f ference in the size d ist ribution of the 
f arms . We lack good d at a  on this point . But what d at a  we do have ind icat e  
that the settler f arms in Kenya were relatively small i n  number and large 
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in size , while c ocoa production in Ghana was engaged in by a fairly 
large number of small-sc ale f armers . 
Brett' s figures d isclose that there were 1 , 183 settler farmers 
in Kenya in 1920 ; in 1929 , the number was 2 , 035 ; and in 1934, 2 , 027 (Brett , 
p .  75).  Given the t o t al area occupied in those year s ,  the average f arm 
size was about 2 , 500 acres per f arm . We also know that there was consider­
ab le inequality in the f arm sizes . Delamere alone , for example is  reported 
to have owned 100, 000 acres (N . Leys , p .  119);  and in 1915 , 13 occupiers 
or roughly one percent of the commerc i al f armers -- are reported to have 
owned twenty percent o f  the land (Van Zwanenberg , 197 5 ,  p .  37).  
If  these d at a  on Kenya are poor , those on Gh ana are wors e ;  
b u t  they nonetheless suggest a distinc tly d i fferent pattern . For 
it is the overwhelming concensus of all reports on the cocoa industry 
that cocoa is produced by a very large number of relatively small 
producers . I llustrative o f  this fact are the figures published by 
the Nowell commission. According to the commission report , the Depart­
ment of Agriculture est imated that there were approximately 300 , 000 
cocoa producers in Ghana in the later 1 9 30s ; this figure is not b ased 
on an actual survey, however . The report also ci tes an est imated 
average farm size of 2 . 5  acres in Ashant i ;  this estimate 
is b ased on �urvey data (United Kingdom, 1938 , pp . 17-18). Becket t ' s  
work in Akokoaso in the 19 30s also reports an average f arm size o f  
2 . 5  acres (Becke tt ) ; other surveys report an average f arm s i ze of 
4 . 2-5 . 2  acres ; the largest estimate reported for this era was 16 . 7  
acres for the area about Suhum-Kib i (Hill ,  1956 , p .  87).  More recent 
work, and especially that of Polly Hill, has demonstrated that there 
is sign ificant variance in the size distribut i on of the cocoa farms , 
and that some o f  the producers are very large and very wealthy iudeed . 
But no ne o f  this rec ent data comp ells a revision o f  the basi c  points 
o f  this argument : that the production o f  cocoa is carried o n  by a 
very large number o f  widely scatt ered smal l-s cal e producers and 
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there is l i ttle tendency for producti o n  to b e  co ncentrated in the hands 
of a few maj or producer s .  While Hill ' s  data do compel us to r ecognize 
that there is more inequality amo ng the cocoa producers than hi therto 
had b e e n  thought , they i n  no way l ead us to infer a size  dist ribution 
o f  farms similar to that which prevailed in Kenya.
Differe nces in the size distribution of the farms may 
wel l  have had a significant impact on the relative abili ty of the 
two sets of farmers to organize in support o f  their common interes t s .  
A given farmer i n  Kenya , b eing one o f  a relatively f ew numb er o f  large 
farmers , could have believed that his behavior would have an impact 
on the  market prices which he con front e d .  By contrast ,  for a Ghanaian 
farme r ,  b e ing b ut one of 300 , 000 small-scale p roducers , it would not 
be reasonab l e  for him to b e l i eve that his individual conduct would 
have a s ignificant impact .  Th e d i f ference in the s i z e  d is tributio n 
o f  farms in the two agricultural indus tries could thus have i n fluenced 
the relat ive strength o f  the i nc e ntives to engage in non-competitive 
behavio r .  
The diff erence may w e l l  have i n f luenced t h e  relative costs 
of c ollus i o n  as wel l .  The fewer the numb er of  farmers a n d  t h e  larger
the i r  average output , th e easier it would b e  to detect  the evasion 
o f  common agre ements.  Thus , for example , we know that in Uas i n  Gishu,
the memb ers of  the Ke nya Farmers ' As sociat ion knew full well tha t 
the other farmers were not c oop erating in s e lling their produc e; for 
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it did not take sales by very many of these farmers to signif i cantly 
depress prices in the local market (Huxley , 1956 , p. 14). By contras t ,  
i t  mus t have been extremely d i f ficult. for the organizers o f  the cocoa 
boycotts , which I discuss below, to detect individual violations o f  
witholding agreements ;  hundreds could have sold their produce b e fore 
a suffic ie n t  volume entered the market to have a signi ficant impact 
on the price . 
The number of produc ers would influence the costs o f  organiz ing 
in another way . Irresp ect ive of the effect on the incentives to 
cooperat e ,  the larger the number of  farmers , the gr eat er the costs of 
reaching potential members o f  a coll ective enterpris e ,  o f  c ommunicating 
with them, and o f  coordinat ing their behavior . A good example of the 
e f fects  of these costs is offered in th e attempt of the cocoa farmers 
to b oycott the 1931 market in an e ffort to drive up prices . Organized 
by peopl e  from the coast , the boycott movement sought to r each and 
incorporate the multitude of  small-scale i nland producers . The 
leaders of  the boycott succeeded in reaching the farmers in Akim 
Abuakwa , the heartland of the cocoa industry at that time ;  but they 
failed to reach the numerous new producers in the interior , and in 
particular thes e in Ashanti.  Once it was realized that the Ashanti 
farmers had not been brought into th e movemen t ,  and that they were 
therefore capitalizing on the rise in prices being creat ed by the 
coop erative e f f orts of  the producers on the coast , then the farmers on 
the coast reent ered the market with their produce and the b oycott 
collapsed . The task of maki ng contact with so large a numb e r  of 
small-scale producers appears to have b e en too high; and failing to 
organ i z e  all of  the producers , the movement could retain th e all egianc e 
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of  none of  them (Tordof f ,  pp . 271 f f ) . 
The f actor of s i ze appears as wel l  to h ave had a significant 
bearing on the deve lopment of  leadership among the f armers of  the two 
territories .  I n  b o th cases ,  leadership was drawn from the large 
f armers . In Kenya ,  Delamere and Grogan provided much of the leadership 
for the commercial f arming c ommunity. While I have been ab le to f ind 
out little about the economic activi ties of the l atter , through the 
work of  Elspeth Huxley , we know a good deal about the former (Huxley , 195 3).
What with 100 , 000 acres of f armland ; over 1 , 200 acres under wheat; 
40 , 000 sheep ; a herd of exotic c attle ; and interests in a creamery , 
milling operations , and timber , it is c lear that for any given 
cos t of organiz ing to provide f avor ab le condi tions for the f arming 
industry, Delamere would s tand to secure considerable private 
benefits from such measures .  There were s trong private incentives for 
him to secure collective benef i ts .  
A s imilar pattern arises i n  the Ghana material . Thus 
Rhodie , in his s tudy o f  the 1931  boycott, isolates the l arge f armer 
as the active agent in the attempts by the cocoa p roducers to drive 
up the market price ( Rhodie , 1968) . And one o f  the leading spokesmen
of the cocoa f armers in this period was Nana Ofori Atta. We know 
that at the time o f  the 1931  b oycott , he had some twenty tons of  
cocoa in storage ( Rhodie , p .  115). We also know that because of  his
political pos ition , he had access to the pro fits o f  a large number 
o f  very prosperous cocoa f arms . As Omanhene o f  Eas tern Akim ( later 
Akim Abuakwa) , Nana Ofori Atta manipulated traditional political 
obligations -- payments for land rights , rental fees for the use of
s tool lands , and tax ob l igat i ons on the part of  immigrant farm 
communities -- to divert the profits from the cocoa indus try to the 
treasury of  his native authority ( Hil l , 196 3 ,  p .  148). Because
his domains included the riches t cocoa l ands of that time , he s tood 
to gain a great deal privately from the increased collective 
well-being o f  the local producers , and he therefore had strong 
private incentive to champion their interests . 
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The s ize distribution o f  farms appears as well t o  have had a 
s igni f ic ant b e ar ing on the development of leadership among the farmers 
o f  the two territor ies . In both c ases , leadership was drawn from the 
large f armers . In Kenya, Delamere and Grogan provided much of the leader­
ship for the c ommerci al f arming community . While I have been able to find 
suggests that the incentives to organize were s tronger in the former . 
And the rel ative s trength o f  the incentives to invest resources in 
organizing thus helps to explain the comp arative vigor of collective 
action in support o f  producer interests in Kenya. 
Before turning to a discuss ion of a third set of factors --
those having to do with the s truc ture and operation of political ins ti­
tutions in Kenya and Ghana -- it is important to note that the fac tors 
we have dis cussed thus f ar help to explain the capacity of o ther 
group s ,  and in p articular the Ghanaian merchant houses , to organize 
collectively in attemp ts to manipul ate the market to their advantage.  
Conditions in the indus try made it credible for the merchants 
to b el ieve that, in the short run at least, they faced a relatively 
inelastic supply of cocoa. The tendency for cocoa to  spo il when 
s tored on the f arm was one reason for this . Equally as important was 
the perception that there exi s t ed relat ively large rent s  for the Ghanaian 
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cocoa p roducers . In p art these rents derived from the superior natural 
condi tions under which cocoa was grown . The rich , as yet unexp lo i ted , 
and th erefore highly fertile soils of the fores t ;  the shel ter from 
the winds o f f ered by the fores t ;  the retention of the mo is ture and 
the d ampening of temperature variations by the forest -- these and 
other f actors , many of which are poorly understoo d ,  created growing 
condi t ions that were apparen t ly unrivaled elsewhere. And b e c ause 
the crop had only recently been introduced in Ghana, diseases had 
not yet developed . The result was that Ghanaian producers appeared 
to enjoy an enormous natural advan t age in the production of this 
crop . Other crops whose product ion would be f avored by these s ame 
f ac tors compared unfavorably with cocoa on other grounds . In the 
y e ars under discussion , the price p er ton o ffered for cocoa was 
from two to five times greater than the price o ffered for p alm o i l  
(Bateman , p .  7). Moreover , the c osts o f  product ion were much lowe r .  
I n  t h e  c ase of cocoa, harvest ing and drying represent the major 
p roduc t ion costs , whereas the product ion of p alm oil requires c are­
ful extrac tion and separat ion as well. Cocoa production thus o ffered 
much g reater profits. As Dickson s tates , "By 1910 f armers in some 
are as . . .  were not merely ignoring the oil-palm trees but f elling 
them to make room for cocoa" (Dickson , 1969 , p. 14 7 ) . That the
p roduct ion of cocoa bore such an enormous economic advantage by 
c omparison with the produc t ion of alternat ive commodities supported 
a convict ion on the p art o f  purchasers that cocoa supp lies would 
be forthcoming over a wide r ange of price s .
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This convict ion , of 
course , furnished an incentive to col lude. 
The s i ze distribut ion of the merchant houses has alre ady 
been noted ; as the informat ion from the Nowe ll commission suggests 
( see t able 2}  the top four firms marke ted two-thirds 
of the cocoa crop . Moreover, the posit ion of one dominant f irm --
the United Africa Company -- provided an incentive for that f irm 
to furnish leadership. That the United Africa Company in i t se l f  
handled over .forty percent o f  t h e  crop helped to insure that a 
f avorab le adjustment of the price of cocoa would yield a sub s t antial 
pr ivate return , despite the costs that it may incur in organ i z ing the 
p rice reduction . The set of f ac tors which helped to explain the 
relat ive disorganization o f  the Ghanaian producers thus helps as 
wel l  to account for the ab ility of the merchant houses to organize 
in pursuit of their interests in the major markets o f  the Ghan ai an 
agricultural industry .  
The S t ructure and Operation o f  Political Inst itut ions 
We have argued throughout this p aper that the political 
c ontext of the agricultural industries had a decisive b e aring on the 
In c ap acity of producers to manipulate their market environment. 
p articular ,  we have argued that the f ac t  that the industries existed 
within a c olonial state decisively influenced the ultimate allocation 
of the gains to be made from cash crop produc tion . In this section , 
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we therefore conclude by actually examining the structure and operation 
o f  the s t ate and the way in which groups within the industry manipulated
the colonial system to enhance their for tunes in the market p l ace. 
The Role of  Coercion. Co lonialism was exploitative . When 
scholars analyze the political-economy of colonialism, they righ t fully 
analyze the use of colonial polit ical ins titut ions by groups to 
extract  resources from others and to  appropriate them for themselves . 
The importance of this phenomenon is obvious . And only access to 
the coercive powers of  the s t ate enable group s to  effect this 
redistribution . 
Far less obvious , but equally as impor t ant , is the use of  
s t ate p ower by members o f  a group to  coerce others of their own kind. 
This , to  my mind , is  a maj or unstudied aspect of  the use of power in 
the colonial period . Indeed , I would argue that in order for the 
first  kind of coerc ion to exist coerc ion b etween ant agonis tic 
groups -- the second kind o f  coerc ion -- coercion be tween members 
of the s ame group -- had f irst to  t ake place . To advance their 
c ommon interest s ,  members of a single social category had first to 
use the power of the s t ate to  compel themselves to  act cooperatively 
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i n  pursuit of  common interest s .  Access to  t h e  s tate , i n  short , provided 
means for organizing . 
Access to coercion is essential t o  the organization o f  
int erest groups , and f o r  several reasons . The mos t  b asic reason is 
the need to resolve the prob lem o f  inappropriate incent ives -- some­
thing which is ap t ly re ferred to as the " free rider problem . " The 
prob lem arises in the c ase of public goods -- goods which are availab le 
t o  any actor irrespect ive of whe ther that actor has contributed to  
the costs  of their provision .  As we have seen , pub l i c  goods can 
exist in private marke t s .  All actors in the market place confront 
the s ame prices; and an arti f ically manipulated p rice is available 
to  all irrespect ive of whether or not they have contributed to the 
to the costs of estab lishing it . The price is thus a public good; 
and as each actor believes he can " free ride" on the efforts of  
others and enj oy the bene ficial price for free , no actor is willing 
to  make the s acrifices required to ob t ain f avorable prices . The 
free rider p roblem also arises in the public sector where publicly 
mandated f reight rates , rates of  taxat ion , or regulations that affect 
the price of  l and amJ. labor create bene f i ts for all members of an 
economic sector,  irrespective of whether they have paid the cos ts 
of  securing them. 
In the presence of the free rider problem, it is extremely 
dif ficult to secure voluntary efforts to at tain collective obj ectives . 
Save in the p resence of the special circumst ances which we have 
already examined , it is in the private interests of all to avoid 
making s acri fice s ;  the public good will be availab le to any actor 
whether or not he makes such sacrifice s .  Given the failure of 
incentives to  provide voluntary collaboration, the public good will 
not be supplie d ;  and everyone may therefore be better off if they 
were coerced to contribute to its formation . Access to means of  
compelling compliance therefore becomes critical . Groups ,  such as 
the set tler f armers in Kenya or the merchant houses in Ghana, which 
can use the s t at e  to coerce their members to sell at the same price 
or to refrain from b idding up the price of  the goods they buy will 
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then operate at a higher level of  profits than if they had not emp loyed 
the coercive power of the s tate in their at tempts to manipulate markets . 
In explaining the divergent fortunes of large-scale producers 
in Kenya and Ghana, then , we mus t pay attent ion to their relat ive access 
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to pub lic institutions . We will therefore scrutinize the s tructure and 
operation o f  public institutions in the two territories. In so  doing , we 
shall evaluate the dif ferences exhibited by the two territories in the 
c on s ti tutional structures which they held in common and we shall note 
as wel l  the effect o f  p articular and distinctive features in their 
politi c al institutions . 
Constitutional Provisions for the Representation o f  Interests .  
The interests of the agricultural producers were but one o f  a diverse 
collection of local interests ; a nece s s arv determinant of the 
respons iveness of the colonial state to the interests o f  the f armers , 
then , was its level o f  respons iveness to local interes ts in general. 
Over the period under discus s ion , political institutions in Kenya 
g ave f ar greater weight to local interests than did those in Ghana. 
And it was precisely here that the r ac i al and n ational cons iderations 
that underpinned the c olon i al system were decis ive; for the government 
o f  Kenya was more willing to devolve p ower local ly b e c ause when it 
did s o ,  it was conferring p ower l argely upon British citi zens who 
h ad sought to make their fortunes abroad . 
As in the vast maj ority o f  British co lonial possess ions , 
the governments of Kenya and Ghana cons isted o f  a governor ,  an 
executive counci l ,  and a legislative council. The governor was 
appointed by the metropole . A key factor determining the respons ive­
ness of the colonial institutions to " local" interests ,  then , was the 
extent to which local interests were represented in the two councils . 
Over the period c overed in this chapte r ,  "local" interests in Kenya 
achieved much greater ac cess to t hese instit utions than did those 
in Ghana. In both territories , the representatives of local 
interes ts -- uno f ficial s , in the constitutional terminology o f  the 
period -- sat in the legislative counc ils ; and until the end o f  
World War I ,  they held an equal proportion o f  the seats - - one 
third o f  the total . Thereaf ter , the situation in the two territories 
r apidly d iverged . Following the First World War , unof f icials in 
the Kenya legis l ative counci l  achieved p arity of numbers with the 
representatives of the colonial administr ation ; not until after the 
Second World War did the proportion o f  unof f icials equal the propor­
tion of  official s  in the legislative council of  Ghana. After World 
War I ,  unof f i cial representation was added to the executive council 
in Kenya; a similar status was no t achieved in Ghana until the Second 
World War. 24 
A second factor influencing the responsiveness of the colonial 
state to local interests was the way in which local representatives 
were chosen. Those who owed their selection to election by loc al 
constituents would more likely seek to make the public adminis tration 
responsive to local interests than would those who were selected 
through nomination by the governor -- the head of the colonial bureau-
cracy . The electoral mechanism was adopted in Kenya in 1919;  seven-
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teen o f  the twenty representatives o f  local interests in the legisla­
tive council were then chosen by election . Not until 1 9 2 5  were elections 
used to choose members o f  the Ghanai an legis l ative counc i l ;  and in that 
case , only three of the fourteen uno ff icials were directly elected , 
six others being "elected" by the chiefs who were thems elves o f ficials 
in the colonial bureaucracy . 
Also important in determin ing the  respons iveness o f  the  colon i a l
adminis t rat ion to local interes ts were the pract ices which were adopted 
in conducting public bus ines s .  A review o f  these practices st rongly 
suggests that the conventions which governed the conduct of public 
business in Kenya ampli f ied the numerical weight accorded to 
its local representatives , thereby augmenting the greater weight 
accorded to local interests by the government o f  Kenya by comparison 
with the weight given them by the government of Ghana. Thus , for 
example ,  in 1923 the government o f  Kenya adopted the practice of 
establishing a Finance Committee "to scrutinize the budget in private 
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before its final s ubmission to the [Legislat ive ] Council " ( Brett , p. 19 4 ) ; 
the commi ttee consis ted o f  all the elected representatives o f  the 
local interests  and but three representatives of the public administra-
tion. As D'illey comments : "This Commit tee is one development which 
has made it possib le for the uno f ficials to exercise the inf luence 
b eyond their cons t i tut ional position . • •  " (Dilley , p .  89) . While 
there was a Finance Committee in Ghana as well, it did not have an 
uno f ficial maj ority,  and its  powers appear to have extended only to the 
deliberation of supplementary estimates (Wight , p .  158) . For much of this 
period , the government of Kenya allowed what amounted to a caucus of the 
unof ficial representatives the right to request the attendance o f  
heads o f  departments so  that the unofficials could probe the way in 
whi ch they were conducting their agency ' s  af fairs ; no such practice was 
followed in Ghana . From the period 19 19-19 2 1 ,  public business in 
Kenya was conducted under an understanding that has been described in 
th e following terms : 
[The ] Government and settlers bound themselves to co-operate 
to the fullest possib le extent . . . .  The Government would not 
introduce a controversical measure by springing it on the 
country without warning , steam-rollering it through Legislative 
Council with the official maj ority . . . .  An important measure 
was , by agreement ,  outlined to the elected members before being 
introduced into Council so that they could express opinions 
and , if necessary , suggest modif�cations . [Huxley , vol. II , 
p .  88 ] .  
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No such practice characterized the conduct of public af fairs in Ghana.  
Rather the o f ficial maj ority was occasionally used to pass legisla-
tion despite the unanimous opposition of African members; in Wight ' s  
words , the government "took the view that the African community had 
not yet reached the stage where its representatives might be given 
the power o f  obstruction in Council" (Wight , p. 92) . 
25 
And indicative 
of  the unwillingness to engage in prior consultation with the representa-
t ives of local interests is  the react ion of  the local representatives 
to legislation introduced to terminate the cocoa boycott of  1 9 3 7 / 38 : 
There was much dissatisfaction that a bill dealing with so  
crucial an issue should be presented in this way . . . •  Mr . Kaj a 
Thompson argued that a b ill of s uch import and magnitude , 
dealing with the existing crisis in the country , needed serious 
and c lose discussion ; moreover ,  that there was no need for 
rushing it through the Chamber . . • .  [Wight , pp . 1 36-1 37 . ]
Thus , the distribution o f  o ffices in public ins ti tutions 
and the way in which persons were selected to fill these of  fices 
gave greater weight to the representation of  local interest s  in 
Kenya and in Ghana . And the practices which were adopted in making 
public poli cy amplified this distinct ion. Local interests in Kenya 
theref ore had greater access to the s tate and a greater ab ility to 
use i t s  power of  coercion to their advantage. And local interests 
in Kenya largely mean t European interes ts , among whom, of  cours e ,  
numbered the large-scale farmers. 
The distinct ion be tween Ghana and Kenya in fact goes even 
deeper . I t  is clear that not j ust  local interests , but rather the 
interests of farm producers in p articular , received greater weight 
in the politic al ins t i tutions in Kenya than they did in those of  
Ghan a ;  and , conversely , s ec tors whos e interes t s  were opposed in 
c r i t i c al respects to those of the producers received disproportionate 
weight in the public ins t i t utions of  the Wes t Coas t  terr i t ory . 
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Thus , in Kenya ,  under the Cons titution o f  1906 , of the three 
rep r es entatives of local int erests , two were farmers ; and under the 
cons t itution of 1919 , of the eleven local uno f f icials representing 
the inter es ts o f  Europ eans in the territory , a full eight represented 
rural f arming constituenc ies . As Bennet t s t at es ,  in designing the 
the const itution : 
electoral areas were to b e  l ineated to represent interes ts 
r ather than numb ers . . . .  i t  was generally realized that 
constituencies b ased on numbers would h ave meant control by 
Nairobi and Mombas a . . . •  Instead , the South African principle
o f  weightage in f avour o f  the rural areas was t aken to a 
more extreme conclusion . . • .  [ 19 6 3 ,  pp . 39-40 . ]
In Ghana, by contras t ,  there was no explicit r epres entat ion o f  farming 
int er ests . The chiefs did s erve as representatives o f  rural interests 
in the high councils of government , and it may be granted that their 
int er ests were in many respects consonant with those of the farmers . 
But in mat ters o f  taxation and the l evels o f  r ents to b e  charged stool 
l ands ,  their interes ts were o f t en in conflict ; and in any case, even 
with enthusiastic backing o f  the chiefs , the interests o f  the farmers 
could eas ily be out-voted by the representatives o f  the merchant houses 
and mining companies . Thus , for example,  until 1916 , o f  the four 
r ep resent atives of local interests , two were Europ ean , one representing 
the mining interes t s  and the other the interes t s  of the merchant houses ; 
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and two were African ,  one representing the urban educ at ed classes and 
th e other the chiefs . The expansion of local representation in 1916  
did little to  help. Again making the unwarranted assump tion o f  an 
identity o f  interests b etween the chiefs and the cocoa producers , 
f arming interests could b e  const rued as holding three o f  the nine 
local votes . Under the cons titution o f  1925 , the chiefs held six 
pos it ions . But , once again , they were a minority in a l egis lative 
body that allocated three positions for the coas t al municip alities , 
one for th e Unit ed Africa Company , one for the merchant houses not 
owned by the United African Company , one for the Chamber of Mines , 
one for the shipping interes t s ,  and one for the Bank of Wes t Africa!  
Wigh t ' s  tabulation of  the questions posed in the Gold Coas t  
legislat ive council over 19 33-1941 reveals that the cocoa industry provo ked 
mor e  inquiries than any o ther subjec t ;  f rom all we have said , i t  i s  clear 
that insof ar as this ass embly made policy in the area, i t  would not do so 
with as high a regard for produc er interests as was given by the l egis-
l at ive council in Kenya .  One is hard pres s ed t o  believe, f o r  example,  
that any governor o f  Kenya could have commented to the Kenyan legislative 
council as contemptuously as did the governor of  Ghana: "You wi ll never 
f ind a f armer who is really s atisfied .  I t  i s  the same i n  England as i t  i s  
h ere. If the weather is dry they want it wet , and if  it is wet they 
want it dry" (Wight , p .  1 34) . In Kenya ,  pandemonium would h ave 
followed ; in Ghana, the governor was t alking about interests  who held no 
s eats in the audience which he was addressing . 
Thus far we have looked at variations b etween Kenya and Ghana 
in the st ructure of the cons titutional forms which they ,  and other 
British territories ,  shared in common . We have s een how wi thin this 
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same constitut ional framework the Kenyan political system gave greater 
weight to local interes ts in general and to farming interes ts in par-
ticula r .  It  is  clear that the st ructure and operat ions of the pol itical 
institut ions in Kenya were such as to introduce a stronger b ias in 
favor o f  producer interests in the making of public policy . In 
addi tion , the two polit ical sys tems possessed dis t inctive characteris tics ; 
and these too influenced the way in which different interes t s  could 
utilize the s tates ' control of  coercion to advance their interests in 
the developing agricultural indus try . 
Centralizat�on of  Power. To a greater extent than was the 
case in Kenya,  in the case of Ghana , there were organized economic 
interests in Britain that brought their influence to bear upon the 
British government so as to maximize the economic returns which they 
could secure from their commercial operations in the colonial terri tory . 
These intere st s ,  o f  course , were the commercial houses . 
Their headquarters were in London , Manches ter , and Liverpool .  In 
Britain , their interests were represented through the chambers of 
comme rce in those towns -- chambers which took an active role in 
influencing pub lic policy , including British policy 
overseas , on behalf of their member s .  Each chamber had a section 
on Wes t African trade ; and the leadership of these sect ions repeatedly 
comb ined to form delegations to lobby the foreign and colonial 
offices on behalf of their trading interests in Africa.
The maj or merchant houses were active in the chambers 
of commerce ; the name of Swanzy for example , appears in the minutes 
26 
of numerous delegations dispatched by the chambers of  commerce . 
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Using the combined influence of their head off ice in England and 
their local repres entatives in Ghana , the merchant houses were ab le 
to manipulate colonial ins titut ions so  as to mob ilize the coercive 
powers of the state in support of their interests in the emerging 
agricultural economy.  
I t  should be noted that the comb ination of access to 
policy-making institutions in both London and Accra was not fortuitous . 
We find , for example, the Board of Directors of the Manches ter 
Chamber of Commerce supporting "the merchants ' proposal" to Lord 
Kimberly at the Colonial Office "that the merchant element in the 
various legislative councils [of West Africa]  should be considerably 
strengthened . 11 2 7  On the other hand , we find scholars such as  Martin
Wight commenting that the merchants ' representatives in the legisla­
t ive counc i l  of  Ghana "hold a watching brief , remaining s ilent unt il 
their immediate interests are touched , and they never speak except to 
the book. They are businessmen , not politicians" (Wight , p .  76) . 
The merchant houses thus had access to both the metropoli tan and 
local centers of  public policy making , and they did so on purpose . 
The advantages of this arrangement were perhaps best revealed in the 
at tempts of  the merchant houses to appropriate a larger share of  the 
revenues generated by the agricultural industry in Ghana by carteliz ing 
the cocoa marke t in 1 9 3 7 .  
The market-sharing agreements that formed the b a s i s  for 
the cartel were not negotiated by the firms in Ghana ; rathe r ,  they 
were negotiated by the head offices in England . At the ini t iat ive 
of the United Africa Company , purchasing agreements were negotiated 
in the late summer and early fall of  1937 . In September of that year , 
in the words of the United Kingdom report : 
Mr . Frank Samuel ,  a Direc tor of the Uni ted Africa Company , Ltd . , 
and Mr . John Cadbury of Messrs . Cadbury Brothers , Ltd . , called 
at the Colonial Office on the 24th of  Septemb er , 19 37 , . . .  to 
offer an explanation of  [ the agreement )  and to request that 
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the information might b e  conveyed to the West African Governments 
concerned . . . •  [United Kingdom, p .  5 2 . ]  
The firms then notified their local representatives of  
the terms of  the agreement and cabled detailed purchasing instruct ions 
to secure its success ful implementat ion . The colonial office , for 
i t s  par t ,  sent dispatches to the Governor of the Gold Coas t detailing 
the agreement and expres sing "the view that the Agreements were j us t i-
fiable on economic grounds" (United Kingdom, p .  5 3 ) . 
The local officials appear in fact to have had deep 
reservations concerning the purchasing agreement s ,  these reservations 
b e ing based on their assessment of its unfavorable impact on local 
politic s .  Despite these reservations , they nonetheless supported 
the ir implementat ion . The mos t  credible characterization of their 
behavior is that they felt it necessary to implement an unwise policy 
foisted on them by their superiors in London . Indeed , given the 
dispatches received from their superiors , they had little choice but 
t o  accept the agreement s  as forming a legitimate basis for public 
policy.  The local adminis trat ion therefore b iased the app licat ion of  
i t s  coercive powers in favor of  the incipient carte l .  I t  
never opposed the imp lementation of  the collusive agreements o n  the 
part of the merchant houses ; but it did rule that the use of state 
p ower to enforce the withholding of  cocoa from the market in response 
to the formation of the b uyers ' car tel cons tituted an illegal 
rest raint of trade (United Kingdom; see a lso Milburn) . 
Decentralization .  I n  some areas critical to the development 
of commercial agriculture in the territory , public institut ions in 
Ghana were thus characterized by a high degree of centralizat ion of 
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policy formation in the me tropole . By contras t ,  Kenya was characterized 
by a high degree of decentralizat ion within the policy-making process.  
And whereas the st ructure of decision making in Ghana appears to 
have b iased the p rocess of  interest representation in favor of the 
buyers of agricultural products , the decentralized structure of 
interest representation in Kenya appears to have given greater access 
to coercive power to the producers of  agricultural commodit ies . 
In the case o f  almost every market of interest to the 
agricultural producers , there existed a government board or policy-
making commi t tee ; and through these ins titutions , the representatives 
of farmers ' interests gained access to pub lic policy . We have already 
observed this in the case of the market for products ; the maize control 
b oard in fact operated as a state sponsored cartel managed by the 
leaders of the producers ' interests.  A similar state of affairs 
existed in the market for land . The government formed a lands 
commit tee to ve t its proposed land laws . The committee contained 
representatives of  the farmers ' inte rests and in fact was chaired 
by Delame re ,  their leading spokesman . Its report urged modificat ions 
that favored the interests of the commercial farmers ( Sorrenson , 1968,  
p.  87) . The government later formed a consultative body called the 
land board to aid in the development of the fundamental ordinances 
governing land development in the terri tory ; farmers ' interests were 
represented on the board and they used their access to secure a 
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"considerable influence on policy formation" in the area ( B enne t t , 196 5 ,  
p .  2 78) . 
A similar pattern obtained in the supply of transport 
services . In f inancing the expansion of these services in the 1 9 2 0 s ,  
t h e  railway sought government backing to  secure its loans ; this 
gave the public sector considerable control over the operations of 
the railway . Thus , for examp le , the location of railway branch 
lines was in part made by a select commi ttee of the legislat ive 
coun c i l .  The representatives o f  local interests had a maj ori ty on 
the c ommit tee (Bret t ,  p .  201) . In the formation of rates , the railway 
management again had to consult with a public body , the Railway 
Advisory Counci l ;  again , the farmers ' representatives dominated this 
ins t itution . As one report noted : "There is more than suspicion 
that unofficial members are nominated [ to the Advisory Council ] t o  
forward certain popular policies and n o t  o n  account o f  the help they 
can give to  the railway management " ( Gibb , p .  8) . The government 
representat ive on the Advisory Council was the Director of Agriculture ; 
as one expert noted , following his invest igation of the operat ion o f  
the railway , "I  think the Direc tors of Agriculture are t o o  much 
interested in the success of their various agricultural schemes 
and are too inclined to seek assis t ance for these schemes through 
railway rates to be . . .  advis ers on railway policy" ( Gibb , p .  1 5 ) . 
The decentralized structure of po licy format ion thus 
promoted control by the farmers ' interests of the condit ions under 
which maj or inputs -- those of land and transport services -- were 
sup p l ied to cash-cropping operations . Their control extended to more 
than j ust  the regulat ion of maj or marke ts , however ; it extended as 
well to the making of commerc ial policy . The most famous example o f  
this is the so-called Bowring Commit tee . In the early 1920s , the 
colonial secretary , named Bowring , formed a committee to promo te 
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the development of expor t s .  Chaired b y  Bowring himself , t h e  c ommittee 
was composed in large part o f  the representatives of farmer intere s t s .  
I t s  behavior was instruc t ive . Rather than supporting the development 
of those crops , such as coffee , in which Kenya had a relative advantage 
in the world market -- the policy it should have followed had the 
commit tee sought to fulfill its public mandate in a socially opt imal 
way -- the committee instead adopted a series of policy measures 
that p romoted those crops which were grown by the maj ority o f  the 
commercial farmers , such as maize and wheat -- crops in the produc-
t ion of which Kenya in fact held a relative disadvantage in the 
world market . 
The committee reduced the railway rates for maize t o  help 
subsidize exports of the crop . As Huxley no tes , "In September , 192 2 ,  
railway rates were lowered to  Shs .  11/20 a ton , and a shipment of 
1 8 , 708 tons , the firs t since before the war followed" ( 19 5 7 , p .  45) . 
And i t  imposed duties on dairy products , meat s ,  wheat , and wheat 
flour . As Wrigley states : 
the cultivation of wheat and the raising of cattle had become 
technically feasible , but the costs of production were such 
that neither wheat nor dairy products could compete even on 
the East African market . . . .  To overcome this dif ficulty , it 
was now dec ided to secure the local market for local producers . 
[Wrigley , p .  236 ] .  
Exploiting its mandate to develop commercial policie s ,  the c ommit tee 
thus manipulated the instruments under its control to help dump 
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ine f ficiently produced cereals on the world market and to shelter the 
domestic market again s t  foreign competit ion in the product ion of 
agricult ural commodities . Through this committee and others the 
agricultural producers thus exploited the decentralized procedures 
for pub lic policy making in Kenya to  develop policy measures that 
secured them a posit ion of advantage in the emerging commercial 
agricultural indus t ry of East Africa . 
Indirect Rule . The policy-making process in Kenya was thus 
distinguished by its degree of decentralization .  I n  addit ion t o  
the greater involvement o f  the metropole , that o f  Ghana was dis­
tinguished by its use o f  indirect rule . The system of special 
interest boards and commit t ees did not exist in Ghana to  the same 
degree as in Kenya ; and it was therefore unavailable as a means o f  
securing the power o f  t h e  s t a t e  to  secure obj ectives i n  the market 
place.  But , as we have noted throughout ,  the farmers did have access 
to pub lic power through the leaders o f  rural interest s : the chiefs . 
We have already noted that the chiefs had c lose economic 
t ie s  with the cocoa indus try . They controlled the sales of s tool 
lands , and often personally pocketed the proceeds of these sales ; 
and a primary determinant o f  the demand for this land was the profit­
ab ility of cocoa p roduc t ion .  Much of their income came from taxes 
and fees collected from the cocoa farmers .  In addit ion , the chiefs 
t hemselves of ten owned farms , served as creditors , or otherwise 
had a deep personal s t ake in the indus try . For all these reasons , 
t hey shared with the producers an in terest in securing higher cocoa 
pr ices . Unlike the purely p r iv a t e  producers , howeve r ,  the ch iefs 
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also exercised control over legal sanction s .  Thus,  i n  both the 
boycot ts of 1 9 3 1  and 1937/38,  the chiefs played an important role. 
They issued publ i c  edicts giving o ff icial support for the boyco t t s ;  
they promulgated local statutes making it  a punishable offense 
to market cocoa during the boyco t t ;  and , in some instances , they 
invoked t heir traditional sacred powers,  making it an act o f  
sacrilege to market cocoa.  
De spite their powers , however , the chief s  were a highly 
imper fect instrument for securing the interes ts of the producers . The 
problem was that while they possessed local power , they lacked 
national power . Each chief had legal power over the behavior o f  
only a small portion of the cocoa producers . To effectively control 
the sale o f  cocoa , nat ional control was needed ; for unless all the 
farmers acted in concert it  was in the interests of none to cooperate . 
As we have seen , however ,  the chiefs were in no position to command 
maj ority support in the nat ional polit ical arena. Indeed, the national 
governmen t reversed the policies which they selec ted , and condemned 
their attempt s  t o  give of ficial backing to farmers ' movements as 
an illegal restraint o f  trade . Without the backing of the colonial 
state , the e fforts of the s tate were doomed to failure . The states 
apport ionment of power among the compet ing int erests was a dec isive 
fac tor in determing which interests prevai led . 
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IV . CONCLUSION 
The most obvious lesson of our case studies is thus that the 
relat ive economic fortunes of groups in the agricultural sector 
reflect their relative polit ical s tanding . Over the period s tudied 
in this paper , the polit ical sys tems o f  Africa were largely designed 
and maintained by colonial powers .  Colonialism can be interpreted 
as  a polit ical system designed to bring economic benefits to 
foreign nat ionals .  In Ghana , the most prominent foreign nationals 
in the agricultural industry were the purchasers and shippers of 
the c ocoa crop ; in Kenya , they were the producers themselves . In 
Ghana , i t  was the purchasers who were best able to collud e  and to set 
prices in the industry to their advantage ; and in Kenya it was the 
producers who achieved such a position . The polit ical system 
provided mechanisms for using political power to redistribute 
economic resources from one group to another and in these instances ,  
the polit ical system was used to redistribute resources from indigenous 
to foreign interest s .  The histor ical record i s  striking enough to 
demonst rate that no study of agricultural development in Africa 
can afford to overlook the decisive importance of politics . 
That much appears c lear . But there are les s obvious but 
equally important lessons to be drawn .  Clearly politics provides 
a means whereby groups can use coerc ion to levy resources from 
o t he rs . But , less obviousl y ,  political power also provides a means
whereby the members of  a group can coerce themse lve s ;  and it is by 
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coercing themse lves that they can attain the capacity for collusive 
behavior . For the members of any given group in the market place , a 
competitive s trategy is the dominant strategy ; in the absence 
of  the ab ility to use the coercive power of the state to penal ize
those who compete,  collusion is thus almost impossible t o  achieve . 
The nonobvious aspect of the importance of access to political 
power is that access to the state furnishes a means whereby 
members of  a given group can make binding agreement s among themselve s .  
I n  this way they can form economically effective groups : groups which 
can cartelize markets ,  engage in noncompetitive economic behavior , and 
thus appropriate the gains to be made from economic activit y .  Insofar 
as state inst itut ions apportion access to coercive power ,  they 
then allocate the means to form organizations . The importance of
the cons t itut ional order , which in these cases was a colonial ord er ,  
i s  thus underscored by these case stud ies . 
The political d imension of the problem is thus fundamenta l .  
The cases revealed the importance of other factors , however , which 
also helped to det ermine the relat ive power of producer int erests . 
One was the nature of the commodities . Differences in the 
elas ticities of demand and supply for the commodities generated 
dif ferences in the incentives to collude . Most basically,  when the 
elast icity of demand is low , producers have an incentive to collude ;  
when i t  is  high -- above unity - - they d o  not . Moreover ,  o ther factor s ,  
such a s  the existence of on-farm uses for the commodity , i t s  
per ishab ility,  and costs  of t ransport play a critical role in 
determining the strategic possib i lit ies open to producers in their 
I 
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competit ion with o ther segments o f  the industry . 
Another factor determining the relative power of producer 
interests was the s ize distribution of groups in the industry . 
Where the number o f  f irms is low and each has a s ignificant portion 
o f  the market -- due to the existence of economies o f  scal e ,  as 
in the case of the merchant houses ,  or to political and historical 
factors , as in the case of the settler farmers of Kenya -- then 
the incentives for collusive behavior are s trengthened . The costs 
of organizing are reduced , the costs o f  policing agreements decline , 
and the benefits f rom noncompetit ive behavior are more easily per­
ceived by members o f  the potent ial combinat ion . Moreover ,  the larger 
the enterprise , the greater the returns for any given contribution 
to the collec t ive e f fort , and thus the stronger the incentive to 
organiz e .  These factors clearly operated to distinguish the 
behavior of  producer interest s  in Kenya from those in Ghan a .  Few in 
number and large in scal e ,  the producers in Kenya had every incentive 
to collude and could easily be organized to do so ; given their ac cess 
t o  state powe r ,  they b ecause an implacable force in the agricultural 
polit ics of  that territory . 
What we have learned from these cases sheds much light on 
the study of contemporary agriculture in Africa . Most basically , 
it sugge sts why it is that most producers do poorly and why it is 
that they are likely to cont inue to do so . It is not by accident , 
in other words , that peasant producers are unable to influence the 
prices they face and to organize ef fectively in de fense of their 
economic interests . They are small.  They are nume rous . Because 
they tend to produce food crops in nations where most families 
can enter food production when prices rise , the elasticity of 
demand for their output is high .  The incentives t o  combine are 
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thus weak and the costs of  organization high .  As one reader pro­
tes ted in reading this paper:  "What you are suggest ing is  that what 
they have to be is to be like Lord Delamere ! "  In the world of  
interest group politics , being like Lord Delamere would help . 
What we have learned also helps to el ucidate the 
except ions to this pattern . Within given state s ,  some farmers 
do bet ter than others . In particular , it would appear that the 
large farmers do better than the small ones . Some of the reasons 
for this are social: large farmers tend to more closely resemble 
in their values and social backgrounds the civil servants who man 
the public services .  But the factors which we have analyzed -­
those which inf luence the costs and benefits of collective action 
are also at play and they help to expl ain this pattern . Moreover,  
the producers in some nations do better than the producers in 
other s .  And i t  tends to be the case that those nat ions which favor 
their farmers are characterized by large-scale producer interest s .  
Where large-scale producers are prevelan t ,  as in such otherwise 
divergent cases as Senegal and South Africa , we find producers 
better able to organize in defense of their interests and better 
able to extract benefits from other sectors of the nation . 
In general , however , the rural producers of Africa do 
poor ly . And s imp ly l is t ing the factors wh ich hel ped t o  d i s t inguish 
the re lative economic power of the groups studied in t h i s  p a p e r  
sugges t s  the depth of the prob lems which they face . Compounding 
their dif ficulties are the basic pol i cy commitments of their 
7 1  
governmen ts . We have seen how the policy commitments of  the colonial 
governments apport ioned acc ess t o  part icular group s ,  g i v i n g  them 
b o t h  t he power to coerce o thers and to make b inding agreements among 
t hemselves . In most of the nat ions of contemporary Afric a ,  a fundamental 
policy commitment has been made to industrial development .  I t  must 
b e  the case that this commitment has influenced the allocation of 
posit ions in consultative bodies , price and income counc ils , 
inter-ministerial commit t ees , pub lic board s ,  and the mul t i tude of  
o ther forums in which interests gain access to  the making of  public
polic y .  We do not as yet have much information about the level 
of representat ion which different interest s  have achieved . But the 
overwhelming importance of gaining that information is one of the 
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1 .  According to f igures in Wolf f ,  in 1905 the production of wheat 
and maize accounted for about eighty-three percent of the total 
acreage cultivated b y  the large-scale producers ; in 1930,  it 
accounted for about f i fty percent (Wolff , p .  73) . Even as 
2 .  
late as 1 9 2 9 ,  over one-half the commercial farmers were primarily 
cereal producers ,  despite the rise of alternat ive crops , such 
as cof fee , sisal , and pyrethreum (Van Zwanenberg , 1 9 7 2 , p .  16) . 
I wish to stress that by concentrating on the relative fate of 
the two groups of  producer s ,  I do not mean to imply that what was 
good for them was good for producers in general , for the 
agricultural industry , or for the economy as a whole . In Kenya , 
as we shall see , what was good for the commercial cereal producers 
was not in fact good for the African cereal growers ,  much less 
for the growth of the colonial economy . And in the Ghanain 
case , it can be persuasively argued that the manipul at ion of 
3 . 
4 .  
5 .  
6 .  
prices against the c ocoa producers so as to d ivert resources 
from the c ocoa indus t ry into other economic sectors would be 
7 3  
a valid and useful means of  promoting the growth of  the national 
economy . While my sympathies c learly lie with the small scale 
farmers , t hen, I am not prepared to argue that their interest s ,  
o r  the int erests o f  any other group , are the same as the public 
interes t ;  nor wi ll I t ake the economic fortunes of  the small 
s cale producers , or any other group , as a valid criter ion for 
evaluating publ i c  policy . 
I omit from this discuss ion the subj ect of agricultural research . 
What little I know about it suggests that the pat tern I observe
in the markets for other imports would obtain with respect t o  
research result s  as we ll . 
See the d iscussion of Labour Circular No . 1 of October 1919 in 
Ros s ;  also in Leys . 
Supportive of this interpretat ion was that the state later sought 
to recapture the land rents through a land tax; the introduction .  
of this tax was success fully resisted by the large-scale producers . 
As Casely Hayford states with pardonable pride : "As a matter of 
fact , the ' lazy Fanti ' is capable o f  putting forth effort amidst 
his own surroundings which men of no othe r race on earth can .  Who , 
7 .  
8 .  
9 .  
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in truth , have been the pioneers and developers o f  the mahogany , 
gold , and rubber industries of the Gold Coast but the ' lazy 
Fant i ' ? " (Hayford , p .  75).  
For a charmingly old-fashioned account of  the contribut ions of  
some of  these men to public l ife in Ghana , see Sampson .  
The best account , o f  course, i s  contained in the works o f  
Polly Hill.  
Evidence of this is contained in the land prices pub lished by 
Polly Hil l ;  they tended to uniformity across a fairly large 
region of the interior (Hill , 1 9 6 3 ,  p .  50) , and to respond 
" correctly" to changes in the prices of the cash crops grown on 
them. 
10 . Church , pp . 129 ff . An interesting reason for the subsequent
concentration of railway extensions in the western region was 
the willingness of the mining companies to directly contribute 
to the costs of construc tion , either by providing wri t t en 
guarantees of traffic levels or by direct payment .  See Church , 
pp . 133  f f .  The cocoa farmers , being smaller and more numerous , 
would have less incentive to f inance the railway in thi s  way 
and would have found it more cost ly to do s o .  
1 1 . During the depress ion , railway charges were rebated to p roducers . 
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12 . It  should be noted that two early inves t igations of the railways 
do in fact argue that c ocoa was charged an excess ively high 
rate -- i . e .  a rate that lay above the marginal costs of trans­
porting it . Thus Hammond viewed the rate on cocoa as being 
set in a way that extracts the natural rent that accrued cocoa 
growing in Ghana ; he thus posits a monopoly premium on the price 
charged for the transport of cocoa (F . D .  Hammond , pp . 66-6 7 ) . 
Ormsby-Gore ' s  famous dictum that "cocoa and cocoa alone at 
p resent enables the railway to pay its way" ( Ormsby-Gore , p .  53) 
only makes sense i f  cocoa were charged at a rate above the cost 
o f  transport ,  while other goods were charged at a rate that 
imposed losses on the railway ; unfortunately , his report does 
not inspire confidence in his abi lity to properly draw such 
an inference . 
13 . See the discussion in Church , p .  149 f f ;  Dickson , 1969 , p .  2 3 3 ;  
Kay , p .  194 . 
1 4 .  Indeed , i t  was precise ly such a reduction in the effec t ive rate 
of interest that drove the local purchasers to turn against 
the export houses when they formed a cartel to purchase the 
1937/38 cocoa crop . The local purchasers j oined , and in many 
localities led , and movement by the farmers to withhold the 
crop from the marke t ,  thereby driving the price b ack up -- and 
the rate of intere s t  up (see United Kingdom, 1938) . 
1 5. Up to fifty p ercen t of the farmers in the same districts 
reportedly sold forward (Uni ted Kingdom, 1938 , p.  3 1 ) . 
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16 . This policy was technically difficult t o  implement . The 
Association was not , of course , 
.
able to handle all the market ing ; 
and its inab ility to do so left opportunities for movements 
between controlled and uncont rolled market areas . The response 
to this threat was the creation of regulations over the movements 
of grains -- regulations that required the issuance of permits 
and the prosecutions of those moving unauthorized amounts of 
scheduled products for unauthorized dis tances (see Heyer) . 
17 . The source o f  this information is A . A .  Haller , "Kenya ' s  Maize
Control : A Rej oinder to Mr . Miracle ' s  Article , " East African
Economic Review, vol .  6 ,  no . 2 .  
1 8 .  The best information on the structure of markets in Kenya is 
contained in Van Zwanenb erg , Bret t ,  Huxley (1957) . See also 
Cone and Lipscomb and William 0. Jones.
19 . As  an example of the way in which the formation of  shipping 
cartels furnished an incent ive for the merchant houses to 
comb ine , we can note the following "Report of the Commercial 
B ills Commit tee" of  the Birmingham Chamber of Commerce of April 
10 , 1895 ; it was writ ten after E . L .  Jones negotiated a rate 
agreement with a competing German line , Woerman Line , for the 
provision of services to West Africa. 
I unders tand that a sett lement between the shipowners
has now been arrived at which included the . • .  German 
lines • . • .  The settlement is unfortunate inasmuch as it 
has taken the direction of leveling up the rates ins tead 
7 7  
o f  leveling down a s  was hoped would have been t h e  result o f
this foreign compet ition • • • .  It  is  much t o  b e  regretted 
that in these matters merchants do not hold and work toge ther 
with anything like the same amity as  the shipowners so 
tha t although the merchants are numerically s tronger and 
although their cus tom is indispensible to the shipowners 
they constantly allow themselves to be worsted in 
negotiat ions of this character • • . .  Until therefore the 
merchants learn from experience a s ensitivity of common 
purpose [ in )  any j o int action it is perhaps only fair 
that they should meanwhile b e  subj ect to • . .  hiring 
condit ions less advantageous than they would otherwise 
enj o y .  
From t h e  f iles of  Lance Davis and Robert Huttenback. 
20 .  Typically , the crop is s tored in warehouses located in temperate 
areas or in its processed form. 
2 1 . During the attempted boycott of the farmers during the 1 9 37-38 
crop year , a sharp fall in the graded quality of  the cocoa that 
was marketed was noted by the authorities . By June o f  1 9 3 8 ,  the 
proport ion of  grade I had fallen to forty percent from a level 
of seventy-f ive percent in November of the previous year . 
The authorities attributed this decline in quality to de teriora-
t i on from prolonged storage ( see United Kingdom, p .  65) . 
2 2 .  A glaring counter-argument to my point springs to mind : the 
ban on c o f fee-growing by African farmers . While I would agree 
that the ban may well have been in the interests of the 
se t t l e r export- crop producers , 1 would argue that i t s  main 
7 8  
support ers were t h e  cereals growers who feared that the growing 
of cash crops by African farm families would raise the costs o f  
labor.  
23 .  There was another important fores t  crop : rubber . We do know 
that the price per ton of rubber compared very favorab ly with 
the p rice for cocoa ( Bateman , p. 7) . We simply know a lot 
less about the costs o f  production of  this crop , and so  we 
cannot readily explain why people left it for the product ion 
of cocoa . My suspicion is that one maj or reason was the nature 
of  property rights over rubber trees . Most  of the li terature
sugge s t s  that it was the destruc t ive management of the trees 
that increased the costs of production to the point where cocoa 
became the more attract ive crop . And without some exp lanation 
b ased on property rights , it is d i f f icult to explain why 
techniques of  production were used that led to the des t ruction 
of the tree s .  
24 . Materials o n  this subj ect can be gleaned from Wight , Kimb le ,
Dilley , and the wr itings o f  Benne t t . 
2 5 .  The government pledged , however , never t o  use i t s  o f f ic ial 
maj ority t o  override the unaimous opposition of  the uno f ficial 
representat ives of African and European interes ts . This p ledge 
was nugatory , however , as Wight ' s  analysis of the vot ing of  
African and European members of the Legislat ive Council reveals 
that they never voted as a bloc (Wight , pp . 89-95) . 
2 6 .  This is supported by materials contained in the no tes taken 
from the Minute Books of the various chambers o f  commerce by 
Lance Davis and Robert Huttenback. 
2 7 . Report on Delegation to Lord Kimberly at the Colonial Of fice , 
May 2 8 ,  1 8 7 3 ; Minutes of the Manchester Chamber of Commerce , 
from the files o f  Lance Davis and Robert Huttenback . 
7 9  
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